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INTRODUCTION
At-large elections, whereby all the voters of a city, county or
other political subdivision vote for all the entity's representatives,
are considered to be an impediment to the election of racial and
ethnic minority candidates. When blacks or Hispanics are a minority
of those voting, their votes alone are usually insufficient to elect a
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candidate. Minority candidates will be defeated unless some number
of whites also support them. If the minority population is geographically concentrated, dividing the jurisdiction into single member
election districts may produce some districts in which the minority
group constitutes a majority of the voters, thereby allowing a mi-

nority candidate to achieve election without white votes.
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
to make it easier for minorities successfully to bring suit to replace

at-large election systems with single member districts.' As amended,
Section 2 prohibits methods of election that result in minorities
having "less opportunity than others to participate in the political
process, and to elect candidates of their choice." 2 Suits brought
under Section 2 are popularly known as "dilution suits."
Prior to the amendment, vote dilution cases were based on the
Constitution, and were won about equally by plaintiffs and defendants. 3 Under amended Section 2, the overwhelming majority of
cases have been decided in favor of the plaintiffs. 4 The reported
decisions tell only part of the story because many jurisdictions
threatened with suit simply have settled rather than incur the substantial expense of defending. Although Congress specifically did

not outlaw at-large elections, the effect of Section 2 has been to
eliminate this electoral system from the political scene in jurisdictions
with sizable minority populations.
1. Section 2 was the preamble to the original 1965 Voting Rights Act, and consisted of
little more than a restatement of the fifteenth amendment. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-110, § 279, 92 Stat. 434, 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982 &

Supp. III 1985)). The amendment to Section 2 came in response to a lobbying effort by civil
rights organizations upset by the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden v. City of Mobile, 446
U.S. 55 (1980). Bolden held that "vote dilution" claims were actionable under the Constitution
only if the challenged election structure was the product of purposeful discrimination. Bolden,
446 U.S. at 67. Prior to Bolden, vote dilution claims were thought to be based on the right
to vote, and thus free from the "intent" requirement of equal protection cases such as
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Id. at 68.
2. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)).
3. The pre-amendment cases were summarized in the Senate Hearing on the proposed
amendments to Section 2 by civil rights lawyer Frank Parker speaking on behalf of the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. In an effort to dispel the notion that
amending Section 2 would lead to automatic victory for plaintiffs, Mr. Parker noted that
defendants had prevailed in over half of the cases under the constitutional standard prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden. Voting Rights Act: Hearing on Bills to Amend the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 Before the Sub-Comm. on the Constitution, of the Senate Comm.
of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. 1, 1205 (the cases are summarized at pages 1216-

26).

4. An examination of the cases identified by a computer search conducted in January,
1990 and designed to locate all cases decided under amended Section 2 revealed that over 75%
of the cases involving challenges to at-large elections had been decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
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The vote dilution suit now is moving into another stage. The
obvious candidates for suit-jurisdictions with substantial minority
populations and few minority elected officials-have changed, voluntarily or involuntarily, to single member districts. Plaintiffs now
are challenging jurisdictions in which the benefits to be gained by a
change to single member districts are more speculative. As the
minority group's percentage of the population decreases, so does
the opportunity to create single member districts in which the group's
members can be a majority of those voting. Absent the ability to
control at least one single-member district, the group risks trading
influence over all the officials in an at-large situation for only a
slightly better chance to control the election of a single member of
the legislative body. In its first interpretation of Section 2, Thornburg
v. Gingles,s the Supreme Court held that a claim of vote dilution
could be made only by those groups that could demonstrate that
they had the numbers and the residential patterns potentially to
control at least one prospective single-member district.
Thornburg thus created a barrier to maintenance of suit by minorities who comprise only a small portion of a jurisdiction's population. In an effort to overcome this barrier, some minority groups
have sought to combine their numbers with those of another minority
group, thereby claiming that the voting strength of the "coalition
of minorities" was unlawfully diluted by the challenged election
system. Thus far, the most common groups to join together for suit
have been blacks and Hispanics. 6
This new "coalition dilution" suit pushes the notion of protection
for minority voting rights far beyond that envisioned by Congress
when it amended Section 2. This new suit raises questions concerning
the underlying "rights" purported to be protected by the dilution
suit, as well as difficult questions of proof and of appropriate
remedies. Moreover, the coalition suit may have an unintended

5.

478 U.S. 30 (1986).

6. The term "Hispanic" includes Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and
populations with origins in other Central and South American countries. Social scientists agree
that these groups cannot appropriately be lumped together as if they shared a common heritage
and history. See generally GAN & DuioAN, THE HisPANcs IN THE UNITED STATEs (1986),
These scholars note that: "The introduction of the term 'Hispanic,' distinct from either 'black'
or 'white,' into the U.S. census was the result of specific political and social considerations
of a particular era in U.S. history. The term conceals enormous differences of a national and
social kind; few 'Hispanics' define themselves as such." Id. at 315. As will become apparent

in subsequent sections of this article, the "Hispanics" who have brought vote dilution suits
primarily have been Mexican-Americans.
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impact on more traditional dilution suits, those brought by a single
minority group, or by two minority groups, each seeking relief for
its members. Defendants may argue that if two or more groups can
be combined for purposes of bringing suit, they should be combined
for remedy purposes, thereby justifying the creation of a single
"minority" district, rather than, say, one predominately black district and another predominately Hispanic district.
Many jurisdictions have "minority" populations of some description that could be "added" together to meet the numerical prerequisite for suit and thus are vulnerable to a "coalition" dilution suit.
Moreover, because most election districts must be redrawn after the
1990 Census to comply with one-person, one-vote mandates, jurisdictions that currently elect their representatives from districts very
shortly must face compliance with Section 2.7 The requirements 'of
Section 2 are far from clear when only a single minority is involved.
In jurisdictions with multiple minority populations, Section 2 presents a veritable quagmire to those responsible for line drawing.
This Article addresses the issues raised by coalition dilution suits.
We hope the Article will assist courts and litigants involved in these
cases, as well as legislators who, after the 1990 Census, must balance
the interests of potentially competing minority groups, along with
the other legitimate concerns that deserve attention when decisions
are made about how the people's representatives will be elected. We
begin with a brief history of the dilution suit, followed by an
elucidation of the Supreme Court's standard for establishing a
violation of Section 2. Next we turn to the specific issue of the
multi-group dilution suit. Did Congress intend to extend the protection of Section 2 to "coalitions"? How have the courts responded?
What does the existing body of knowledge concerning blacks and
Mexican-Americans (the most likely combination to bring suit) tell
us about the potential for these two groups to become one? What
has been the experience to date with black-Hispanic political coalitions?
Ultimately we conclude that the dilution suit, which was conceived
initially to provide some measure of political participation for groups
excluded by racism from the normal coalition-building essential to
electoral success, should be extended to protect a "minority coali-

7. Electing representatives from districts, rather than at-large, does not assure compliance
with Section 2. Concentrations of minority population may be divided among several districts,
such that the group is unable to control the electoral outcome in any district.
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tion" only in the most unusual of circumstances. A coalition dilution
suit should be available only if the two groups can establish that
they are so bound together by a common history of exclusion, that

their political interests are so similar, and their past political behavior
so uniform as to make the two groups one for purposes of the
group-based relief available under Section 2. As a practical matter,
such a merger of interests has rarely, if ever, been documented.
Despite the rhetoric of political leaders, and the benefits seemingly
to be gained, "Rainbow Coalitions" seldom form, and those that
do form seldom last.
II.

A.

A B=uEF HISTORY OF THE DLUTION SUIT

ConstitutionalPrecedents: Whitcomb to Mobile

When Congress amended Section 2 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act
to provide a new statutory basis for the dilution suit, it directed the
lower courts to return to the standard that had governed these cases
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden.8
This case held that the "intent" requirement of other equal protection cases applied in vote dilution cases as well. 9 Technically, the

principles of these pre-Bolden constitutional cases remain legally, if
not practically, relevant. At the very least, they form an important
backdrop for understanding the "modern" dilution suit, and thus
for determining if Section 2 should be extended to protect "coalitions."
The 1965 Voting Rights Act quickly and effectively eliminated
barriers that black citizens previously experienced in registration,
balloting, and running for office. But, years after the Act had
produced monumental gains in registration, the most visible symbol
of black political participation remained largely absent; blacks held
only a fraction of the elected offices in the nation, including the
South, where in many places they constituted a large segment of the

8. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
9. See S.REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, at 177, ([hereinafter SENATE REPORT],
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN.NEws 179) (which indicates that the purpose of the
amendment was to eliminate the intent requirement in vote dilution cases, and to "restore the
legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to Mobile v. Bolden.").
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electorate.10 Black office holding was disproportionately low everywhere, but the problem was most pronounced and a "cure" most
readily available where members of the legislative body were elected
either from multimember districts" or at-large.
The problem these electoral mechanisms posed for black political
aspiration was easily stated: To be elected in an at-large system, a
candidate usually needed support from a majority of the jurisdiction's voters; minority candidates often could anticipate the support
of their racial or ethnic group, but these votes were insufficient to
carry the election; absent support from non-group members-the
same voters who had so recently endorsed mass disfranchisement of
blacks-minority candidates lost; housing patterns often were such
that the creation of single-member districts 2 would result in some
districts having a majority of black voters, providing the potential
for the election of candidates solely with black ballots. Initially,
there was no express claim that white officials could not represent
blacks, but all-white legislative bodies were a continuing symbol of
black exclusion. Understandably, blacks wanted to see blacks in
office.
Defining the problem and proposing a solution proved easier than
constructing a theory for a group's "right" to avoid the consequences of majority rule. The thread of a theory was suggested by
the malapportionment decisions. If an individual's vote could be
unconstitutionally diluted because it carried less weight than that of
a citizen living in a less populated district, could not that vote be
diluted as well by other non- quantitative factors? Dicta in two early
Supreme Court malapportionment decisions hinted that such a claim
would be entertained. 3 While both cases affirmed that multimember

10. According to the Joint Center for Political Studies, in 1980, blacks, who were 11%
of the nation's population, were one percent of the elected officials. 10 NATIONAL ROSTER OF
BLACK ELECTED

OFFICIALS 1 (1980).

11. Multimember districts are election units from which more than one office holder is
elected. They are employed more commonly in state legislatures than in local governments,
counties, municipalities, and school boards. Some states employed multimember districts as a
means to retain "county representation" in one or both houses of the legislature after Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), declared population to be the only basis for assigning representatives. A multimember district is only one of several units of the jurisdiction from which
legislators are elected. By contrast, all the jurisdiction's voters vote for all candidates in an
at-large system.
12. A single-member district system is one in which the political unit, a county, for
example, is divided into a number of sections (districts), each one of which elects a single
representative.
13. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 94 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 459
(1965).
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districts were not per se unconstitutional, the Court indicated that
under some circumstances they could operate to minimize or cancel
4
out the voting strength of racial or political groups
The first serious attempt to rely on this dicta failed, but the case,
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 5 paved the way for future cases. In Whitcomb,
the Supreme Court announced the standard that ultimately was
incorporated into Section 2.
Whitcomb involved a challenge to the multimember district for
electing the state house and senate representatives from Marion
County, Indiana. The plaintiffs were black residents of an Indiana
ghetto. They alleged that candidates supported by ghetto residents
seldom were elected to the legislature and contended that were the
county divided into single member districts, the ghetto residents were
sufficiently numerous and sufficiently geographically concentrated
in their housing patterns to constitute a majority in some of the
districts.1 6 The lower court accepted the plaintiffs' theory that as
poor blacks they constituted a cognizable minority group with needs
and interests not shared by the county's white citizens. These interests
were possibly subject to amelioration through the political process,
but multimember districts prevented the group from electing representatives who were sympathetic to those interests. Thus, the lower
court found the cognizable minority status of the group, plus the
absence of proportional representation equalled vote dilution in
7
violation of the Constitution.'
The Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence that the petitioners had been denied access to the political process.' 8 The absence
of proportional representation did not prove discrimination absent
evidence that the group had less opportunity than others to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of its choice. 19
The lower court had focused on the group's status as a "cognizable
minority," and on its failure to achieve proportional representation. 20
The Supreme Court, however, concentrated on evidence of exclusion
from the process: nothing in the record indicated that "poor Negroes
were not allowed to register or vote, to choose the political party
14.

Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 451

(1965).
15.

403 U.S. 124 (1971).

16.

Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 139-40.

17.

Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1385 (S.D. Ind. 1969).

18.

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50.

19. Id.
20. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1384-86.
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they desired to support, to participate in its affairs, or to be equally
represented on those occasions when legislative candidates were
2
chosen." '
In the Court's view, it was politics-in the form of party competition and majority rule-not race, that resulted in very few ghetto
residents being elected. Blacks had special concerns, but there was
no evidence that they lacked the opportunity to voice them in the
electoral process. The Democratic Party regularly slated black candidates who fared no better and no worse in the"general election
than did white Democrats. In recent elections, all Democrats had
lost. The dilution of black voting strength was thus "a mere euphemism for political defeat;" party, not race, determined political
22
outcomes in Marion County.
In White v. Regester,2 3 blacks in one county and Hispanics in
another were successful in attacking multimember districts in the
Texas House apportionment scheme. The plaintiffs crafted their
attack to distinguish the situation in Texas from that at issue in
Whitcomb. The district court was convinced. The district court found
that in Dallas County black citizens had been excluded from the
electoral process by a history of racial discrimination, by a process
of candidate slating by white dominated groups, by the use of racist
campaign tactics, and by the presence of majority vote and other
rules that made the election of minority supported candidates more
difficult.24 In Bexar County, the district court found that Mexican
Americans also suffered from a history of discrimination, that
language and cultural barriers made political participation extremely
difficult, and, combined with restrictive registration procedures,
produced a "cultural incompatibility" that denied Mexican Ameri-

cans political access. In both counties, the evidence indicated that
elected officials were not responsive to the interests of their minority
constituents, thereby further suggesting that their votes played a
26
relatively minor role in the electoral process.
The rather cryptic opinion of the Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's finding of dilution. The Court concluded that the facts
found by the lower court were sufficient to support its conclusion

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149.
Id. at 153.
412 U.S. 755 (1973).
Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 726-27 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
Id. at 733.
Id. at 731.
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that the two groups had been denied an equal opportunity to
participate in the political process. 27
Whitcomb and White thus provided the parameters for dilution
suits. Both of these cases recognized, as did all subsequent cases,
that at-large elections were not per se a violation of the Constitution.
Whitcomb clearly established that a cognizable minority is not by
virtue of its group status entitled to proportional representation.
Nor is any group protected from the normal uncertainties of politics-including the consistent defeat of its candidates. 28 In White,
the Court recognized that not all candidates lose for normal political
reasons. Under certain circumstances, groups are "fenced out" of
the political process for reasons that have less to do with normal
politics, and more to do with a history of discrimination and the
present attitudes of the majority toward the group and those who
espouse its interests. 29
The Court's opinion in White provided little guidance for making
the distinction between normal political defeat and exclusion because
of race. Lower courts, in reliance upon the district court opinion in
White, developed the so-called "totality of the circumstances" test,
which set out a number of factors to be weighted in this determination. The primary factors enumerated were: (1) Lack of minority
access to the slating of candidates; (2) unresponsiveness of legislators
to the particularized interests of minorities; (3) a tenuous state policy
underlying the preference for at-large election; and (4) a history of
past discrimination that precluded the group from effectively participating in the political process. Other factors included the existence
of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, and the absence of residency subdistricts3 0
While the lower courts struggled valiantly to follow both Whitcomb and White, the totality of the circumstances test remained at
best subjective, and at worst arbitrary. Different judges weighed the
same facts differently so that the outcome of the cases appeared to
depend more upon the assignment of the trial judge than on the
facts of the case.3
27.

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973).

28.

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 151-54 (1971).

29.

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 770-771.

30. See, e.g., Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
31. See A. THERNsTRoM, WHOSE VoTEs COUNT? 74-78 (1987), [hereinafter A. THERN TRoh ]
(for criticism of the "totality of circumstances" test); Butler, Constitutional and Statutory
Challenges to Election Structure: Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REv.
851, 886-90 (1982) [hereinafter Butler-Dilution].
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Plaintiffs in constitutional dilution cases proceeded on the assumption that because effective political participation was the issue,
proof of a discriminatory purpose behind the adoption or maintenance of the at-large system was not necessary. However, in 1978,
a panel of the Fifth Circuit held in Nevett v. Sides 2 that the mandate
of Washington v. Davis33 applied with equal force to vote dilution
cases. The court went on to say, however, that the "totality of the
4
circumstances" test was sufficient to infer discriminatory intent.1
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, a majority of the Supreme Court
agreed with the decision in Nevitt that proof of discriminatory intent
was essential to the claim, but disagreed as to the relevance of the
"totality of the circumstances" test as evidence of discriminatory
purpose. 35 On the basis of facts similar to those found by the lower
court in White, the trial court in Bolden had found that Mobile's
commission form of government denied the Alabama city's black6
3
citizens an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process.
The high court's reversal of Bolden led many observers to argue
that White had been overruled.
B.

Congress Amends the Voting Rights Act

Bolden was decided on the eve of the expiration of certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act, thereby setting the stage for a
concerted lobbying effort to develop a statutory substitute for constitutional claims. 37 The battle to amend Section 2, which in the end8
was decisively one-sided, has been admirably chronicled by others.1
A very brief summary will suffice for our purposes.
Clearly the civil rights groups sought more from Congress than
they dared to ask. They wanted a standard based on the lower

32. 571 F.2d 209, 218 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that proof of discriminatory purpose was an essential
element in an equal protection challenge to a facially neutral state action).
34. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d at 219.
35. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 (1980).
36. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 398-401 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
37. Vote dilution decisions prior to Bolden were a mixed bag. Plaintiffs won some cases
and lost others, and distinctions between cases finding dilution and those that did not were
difficult to discern. See generally, Butler-Dilution, supra note 31, at 890. Nevertheless, civil
rights groups saw the suit as essential to the attainment of political equality for minorities.
Bolden, they believed, sounded its death knell.
38. See generally A. THmRasTom,, supra note 31, chs. 5 & 6; Boyd & Markman, The 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 NWAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1347
(1983). This portion of the Article is taken primarily from these sources.
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court's decision in Whitcomb, which in essence was a proportional
representation by race standard. What they asked for was a return
to White, and the totality of the circumstances test. Proponents
argued in the congressional hearings that proportional representation
would not become the standard, and that at-large elections would
not become extinct. In support of these arguments, they cited the
numerous pre-Bolden decisions in which plaintiffs lost, despite a
total absence of black elected officials.
Opponents argued that if the intent test of Bolden was replaced
with a "results" test, inevitably the standard would become proportional representation. To replace "intent" with "result" would
be to substitute a "fair share" for a "fair shake."
In the end Congress compromised. Congress amended Section 2,
and gave civil rights groups what they said they wanted. Carefully
drafted legislative history in the form of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report recorded that the purpose of the amendment was to
restore the White v. Regester standard. The report stated, "[i]n
adopting the 'results standard' as articulated in White v. Regester,
the Committee has codified the basic principle in the case as it was
applied prior to the Mobile litigation. '39 To placate opponents,
however, a disclaimer of any right to proportional representation
was added to the statute. 40
Section 2 now reads in pertinent part:
(a) No voting ... practice ... shall be imposed by any ...

political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of
race or color, or [membership in language minority groups protected by the Act] ...
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on a totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to office in
the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may

39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 28, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEWS 177, 205-06.
40. The disclaimer was necessary to gain bipartisan support for the bill. SENATE REPORT,
supra, note 9, at 193-95, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 363-66
(additional views of Senator Dole).

630
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be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a
elected in numbers
right to have members of a protected class
41
equal to their proportion in the population.
The first sentence of part (b) of the Section is taken directly from
White v. Regester.42 The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
sets out nine factors, gleaned from White, and other pre-Bolden
dilution cases, that the committee considered to be relevant to the
determination of a violation:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state
or political subdivision that touched the right of members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in
the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, antisingle shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which the members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in
such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
group have been
7. the extent to which members of the minority
43
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Two additional factors might have limited relevance: whether there
is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials
to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group;
and whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's
use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, standard,
practice or procedure is tenuous. 44
Congress thus opted to continue the vague totality of the circumstances standard. While generally unsatisfactory, this test had not
41. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110 § 279, 92 Stat. 434, 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
42. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 771 (1973).
43. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 29, reprinted in U.S.
at 206-207.
44. Id.

CODE CONG. &

ADnw.

NEws
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in the past proved to be a euphemism for proportional representation. If the courts continued as they had before Bolden, the opponents' view was not inevitable. A "discriminatory result" did not
have to be equated with a "disproportionate impact." However, as
will be seen in the next section, the views of the amendment's
opponents have proven to be largely correct. While the courts have
given lip service to the "totality of the circumstances, ' 45 their
weighing of the "factors" has almost always been against at-large
elections.
III.

Thornburg v. Gingles: THE Sur Rvm COURT OUTLINES THE
STANDARD

A.

46

The Setting

In 1986, the Supreme Court delivered its first interpretation of
amended Section 2 in the case of Thornburg v. Gingles.47 The case
began as Gingles v. Edmisten48 before a three-judge court in North
Carolina. 49 Black voters challenged six multimember districts, and
one single member district in North Carolina's 1980 legislative apportionment plan.5 0 The multimember districts "submerged" their
voting strength, and the single member district "fragmented" blacks
into two districts, they claimed. 51
The opinion of the lower court began by noting that the preBolden racial vote dilution jurisprudence was to be controlling.5 2
The essence of these suits, said the court, was that dilution occurs
when "the interaction of substantial and persistent racial polarization
45. The lower courts generally have substituted the so-called "Senate Report" factors for
the Zimmer factors as a guide to their determination under Section 2. See, e.g., Gingles v.
Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 354 (E.D. N.C. 1984).

46. The Thornburg decision has been hailed as a major victory by civil rights groups.
The various opinions written in this case, including that of the lower court , contain serious
flaws. However, a major critique of Thornburg is beyond the scope of this article. Our tack
therefore is to "accept" the decision, to propose interpretation when important to the future
of the "coalition dilution" suit, but otherwise to leave a full expos6 of Thornburg for another
article.
47. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
48. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. N.C. 1984).
49. Thornburg v. Gingles, 476 U.S. 30, 34, 35 n.3.

50. Id. at 35.
51.
52.

Id. at 46.
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 351-52.
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in voting patterns ... with a challenged electoral mechanism, [pre-

vents] a racial minority with distinctive group interests that are
capable of aid or amelioration by government [from utilizing its]
political power to further those interests. '53 The factors set out in
White, Zimmer, and the Senate report are to be considered, but the
unwillingness of large segments of the white electorate to vote for
any candidate identified with minority interests is the linchpin of
the suit.
The court's seventeen pages of detailed evidentiary findings covered all the Senate report factors. The court recounted North Carolina's history of racial discrimination in voting matters from
reconstruction through 1970. The court concluded that past discrimination in the form of literacy tests (not ended in all forms everywhere until 1970) and poll taxes (abolished in 1948) contributed to
lower voter registration by blacks, who in 1982 lagged fourteen
percentage points behind whites in registration of eligible voters.
Good faith efforts by the present administration to improve voter
54
registration had not yet closed the gap.
Discrimination in other areas, such as education, employment,
housing, and health facilities produced a black citizenry of lower
socioeconomic status than whites. This status gave the group special
interests not shared by whites, and at the same time, hampered the
55
group's ability to participate in the political process.
Although the majority vote requirement in primaries had never
been solely responsible for the defeat of a black candidate in the
challenged districts, the court found it to be an additional structural
56
impediment to the election of black candidates.
The court found racial appeals in political campaigns as'recent as
the present. No examples appeared in the opinion, but the court
found the campaign materials "reveal an unmistakable intention by
their dissemination to exploit existing fears and prejudices . .. on

the part of white citizens . . .-5 The racial appeals, concluded the
court, contribute to diminished opportunities for blacks to effectively
participate in the political process.5 8

53.
54.
55.

Id. at 355.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 363.

56. Id.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 364.
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While blacks had been voted into office at all levels from city
councils to judgeships elected state-wide, at no level had they achieved
proportional representation.5 9 From 1975 to 1983, blacks held 2-4%
of the Senate seats and 1.6-3.3% of the House seats. 60 In the first
blacks, five from
election under the 1982 redistricting plan, eleven
6
challenged districts, were elected to the House. '
The voters in each of the challenged districts, except one, had at
some time elected blacks to either the House, Senate, or both.62 In
every district blacks had been elected to local offices.63 The court
acknowledged that black citizens could be elected to office at all
levels of state government in North Carolina, but found the overall
results to be minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks in the
total population. 4 The 1982 successes were seen as "aberrational,"
in part because white leaders might have seen the election of blacks
as a means to forestall single member districting. 65 The court's failure
to find significance in the election of black candidates was a primary
issue on appeal."
The most controversial of the court's findings concerned racial
polarization in voting. The court found significant polarization (a
term not specifically defined, but apparently meaning that a majority
of white voters voted differently from a majority of black voters).
This conclusion was based solely on the analysis of black-white
election contests. The court discounted white support for black
candidates, which varied widely among candidates, but was often
above thirty percent in primaries and forty percent in general election. The availability of single shot voting 67 helped blacks to elect
candidates of their choice, but, according to the court, any benefit to
this was offset by having to forfeit their right to vote for a full slate

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 364-67.
Id. at 365-66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 367.

65.

Id. at 367 n.27.

66.

Id. at 364-67.

67.

"Single shot voting" means to vote for fewer than the number of offices up for

election. Butler-Dilution, supra note 31, at 863-76. For example, in a multimember district in
which four representatives are to be elected from a field of candidates (i.e., all candidates run

against all others with the top four vote-getters achieving election) a black candidate's chances
of being elected are increased if black voters vote only for him, rather than casting all four
of their votes, three of which would have to be cast for his opponent. For a discussion of the
impact of various electoral mechanisms on the ability of a minority group to elect a candidate
by its votes alone see id.
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of candidates.65 The court did not make any express finding about
whether the level of polarization in each district prevented the election
of black candidates, who, incidently, won more often than they lost.69
In the remainder of the factual findings, the court discounted all
evidence of mitigating circumstances. While applauding the state's
recent efforts to afford greater political participation for blacks,
including "increased willingness on the part of influential white politicians openly to draw black citizens into political coalitions and openly
to support their candidates," the court found it to be too little, too
late. 70 Views of blacks testifying in opposition to single member districts
71
were rejected as those of a "distinct minority" of the plaintiff class.
Legitimate, non-racial, state policies favoring the utilization of multimember districts could not outweigh a racially dilutive result. 72
Looking at the totality of the circumstances in each multimember
district, the court concluded that blacks had less opportunity than
others to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. 7 As to the challenged single member district, the court
found a similar result brought about by "fracturing" a minority
population concentration into two districts. 74
Essentially, the court went through the check list of Senate report
factors, finding most of them present to one degree or another, then
looked to see if black electoral success was nevertheless equal to what
could potentially be achieved through the use of single member districts. Although some of the challenged districts had, at the time of
trial, achieved this level of black success, the court was not satisfied
that future success was guaranteed. Near proportional representation
for ten years was insufficient evidence of political participation to
satisfy the trial court.
North Carolina's appeal centered on the lower court's failure to
give much weight to the record of black candidate success, which by
68.

Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 369.

69. Id. at 367-72. Polarization, according to the court, results in dilution when it interacts
with the election structure to prevent a racial minority's furthering its distinctive group interests
through the political process. Id. The court then evidently equated "furthering of the group's

interest" with "electing black candidates," because that was the only "political interest"
considered by the court. Id. The evidence that even this narrowly defined interest was being
thwarted by polarization was weak, in light of the reasonable record of black candidates'

success in some of the challenged districts. Id.
70. Id. at 372.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 373-74.
Id. at 374.

74. Id. at 374-75. North Carolina justified the use of multimember districts as a means
to maintain the political integrity of county lines. Id.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
any measure was vastly better in most of the challenged districts than
that found in any pre-Bolden case won by plaintiffs. The state argued
that the lower court had utilized an erroneous definition of legally
significant polarization, in part because the court deemed election
contests "significantly polarized" even when black candidates were
elected. Moreover, it argued, the record of black candidate success
was so substantial as to render the ultimate conclusion of dilution
7
erroneous. In six of the seven districts, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's conclusion that the districts impaired black voting strength in
violation of Section 2.76 Despite unanimity on the decision, there were
four opinions written, one of which sounded more like a dissent than
a concurrence.n All of the Justices clearly agreed on only two points:
The ultimate conclusion that dilution existed was an issue of fact; and
the district court's findings of dilution were not clearly erroneous in
six of the seven challenged districts. As to the seventh district, one of
the multimember districts, a majority of the court agreed with North
Carolina. The record of black candidate success was so substantial as
to make the lower court's determination of dilution "clearly erroneous." ' 78 There was no majority view on some issues of importance for
subsequent cases. 79
B.

The Prerequisites to Suit

Before addressing the issues actually raised by the appeal in Thornburg, the Supreme Court explained the underlying basis for dilution
75.

Appellant's Brief at 61, Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1968,

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (No. 83-1968) (Filed July 3, 1985); Appellant's

Reply Brief at 19, Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1968, Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (No. 83-1968) (filed Nov. 22, 1985).
76. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 73-74 (1986).

77.

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, and White, delivered

the five-part opinion of the Court. Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Powell, filed an opinion that while sounding like a dissent, concurred

with the Court's judgment (but not with its opinion). Id. at 81-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice White disagreed in part with Justice Brennan, and filed a separate opinion on the
point of disagreement. Id. at 85 ('White, J., dissenting in part). Justices Stevens, Marshall,

and Blackmun dissented from the portion of the opinion reversing the trial court's determination
in one district. Id. at 84-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78.

Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 77.

79. For example, there was no majority view as to whether racial polarization remained
legally significant if it could be demonstrated that a majority of white voters had rejected
candidates preferred by blacks for reasons unrelated to race. Justices Brennan, Marshall,

Blackmun, and Stevens thought the reasons for white voter behavior were irrelevant. Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Powell disagreed. Justice White disagreed with this portion of
Justice Brennan's opinion, but did not clearly state his view.
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claims under amended Section 2, which it acknowledges was intended
to resurrect pre-Bolden law:
The essence of a Sec.2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice
or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause
an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters
to elect their preferred representatives ... [Its] theoretical basis
S.. is that where minority and majority voters consistently prefer
different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters.80
While any of the factors set out in the Senate report may be relevant
to a finding of dilution, the Court indicated that:
These circumstances are necessary preconditions for [a violation]
•.. First, the minority group must be . . . sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority of a single member
district ... Second, the minority group must be ... politically
cohesive . . . Third, . . . the white majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances ...
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.81
While there have been a few post-Thornburg decisions that appeared to emphasize these factors to the exclusion of the totality of
the circumstances analysis,8 2 the better reasoned interpretation of
this portion of the Court's opinion is that these factors are essential
to the plaintiff's case, but not in and of themselves conclusive of
the existence of dilution. Because the lower court made specific
findings as to each of the Senate report factors, the Supreme Court
clearly was not faced with deciding whether satisfying the prerequisites alone was sufficient to establish dilution.
Without proof of each of the prerequisites, the plaintiffs cannot
prevail. Thus, there is no remedy for a group that lacks the numbers,
or is too geographically dispersed to benefit from single member
districts, even if every additional Senate report factor is present.
Likewise, there is no "cognizable minority group" to claim the
benefits of Section 2 unless the plaintiffs demonstrate that the
jurisdiction's minority citizens are sufficiently unified in their support
of particular candidates to take advantage of the creation of a

80. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 47-48.
81. Id. at 50-51.
82. Some may read City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547
(11th Cir. 1987), as such a case. A more reasoned analysis of that case, however, reveals that
it does little more than indicate that the lower court's findings, which predated Gingles, were
based on a standard inconsistent with Gingles. NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1561 (11th
Cir. 1987).
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district in which they would be in the majority. Even if minority
citizens are sufficiently numerous, geographically compact, and vote
together, the group has not been deprived of equal participation

unless the majority votes in such a manner as to consistently defeat
the group's political choices.
C. The Totality of the Circumstances Doctrine
Although a majority of cases after Thornburg have seemingly
turned on the prerequisites, 83 most courts continue to address the
remaining Senate report factors. The most logical reading of Thornburg is that plaintiffs must first prevail on each prerequisite. Only
then is the court faced with determining whether, based on the

totality of the circumstances, including not only these factors, and
the remaining Senate report factors, but any other relevant evidence,

plaintiffs have been denied an equal opportunity to participate in
the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. The
ultimate question of dilution is one of fact, committed to the trial
judge who is to decide it based on "an intensely local appraisal of
the design and impact of the ... multimember district in light of

past and present reality, political and otherwise. "84
In emphasizing the factual, and intensely local, nature of the
inquiry, the Court stated:
As both amended Sec. 2 and its legislative history make clear, in
evaluating a statutory claim of vote dilution through districting,
the trial court is to consider the "totality of the circumstances"

83. When all three have been present, plaintiffs, with rare exceptions, have won. The few
cases decided in favor of the defendants usually have involved situations in which plaintiffs
failed to establish one of the three preconditions (usually the first or second). See, e.g., McNeil
v. City of Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1769
(1989) (affirming a decision of the trial court for the defendants because blacks, who were
able to constitute a majority of the population of a district, were slightly less than a majority
of the voting age population); Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming the
lower court's denial of relief because the plaintiffs numbers were insufficient); Overton v.
City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir: 1988) (affirming trial court's denial of relief, based in
part on neither blacks nor Hispanics being able to command a voting age majority in any
district); Williams v. State Board of Elections, 718 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (dismissing
claims of Hispanic subclass because its numbers were insufficient); Romero v. City of Pomona,
665 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (denying relief because neither blacks, nor Hispanics
standing alone could satisfy the requirement, and their numbers could not be combined because
the two groups were not politically cohesive); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss.
1987) (denying relief to plaintiffs from multimember districts for which no "majority-minority"
district could be created).
84. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 78 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1970)).
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and to determine, based "upon a searching practical evaluation of
the 'past and present reality,'.

. .

whether the political process is

equally open to minority voters. This determination is peculiarly
dependent upon the facts of each case." ' 5

The "ProportionalRepresentation" Defense

D.

Thornburg contains one additional step in the determination of a
violation of Section 2-an evaluation of the extent of electoral
success of candidates supported by the minority group. The consistent election of black officials serves as an additional limitation on
when plaintiffs may prevail. The Court noted "that unless minority
group members experience substantial difficulty in electing candidates
of their choice, they cannot prove that8 6a challenged electoral mechanism impairs their ability 'to elect."'
Even if every single Senate report factor, including the Thornburg
prerequisites, is present, plaintiffs may not prevail if minority supported candidates consistently have been elected. In all but one
district challenged in Thornburg, the Court concluded that the record
of success was not so substantial as to overcome the trial court's
finding of dilution as a matter of law. As to one district, however,
the sustained success of black candidates was sufficient to make the
87
lower court's finding of dilution in that district clearly erroneous.
Without disturbing the lower court's other finding for that districtwhich included the existence of all the Senate report factors-the
Court reversed the ultimate conclusion of dilution. The import of
the decision to reverse is obvious: Consistent election of candidates
supported by a majority of the jurisdiction's minority voters is a
88
defense to dilution.
It is important to recognize, however, that the level of black
candidate success that will overcome a finding of dilution is very
substantial. In the district in which the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's determination, blacks had achieved proportional representation for at least ten years. A lesser, but still substantial,
record of success in some of the other districts was not sufficient
to overturn the ultimate conclusion of dilution. It is equally impor-

85. Id. at 79.
86.

Id. at 49 n.15.

87. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 77.
88.

Id.
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tant to recognize that the issue faced by the Supreme Court was:
May a court that has done an analysis based on the totality of the
circumstances legitimately find dilution if blacks have enjoyed significant electoral success? The issue was not: Must a court that has
done an analysis based on the totality of the circumstances find
dilution if blacks have not enjoyed significant electoral success? The
failure to recognize this distinction almost certainly will have the
effect of reading the "proportional representation" disclaimer right
89
out of the act.
E.

The Ultimate Conclusion of Dilution

The standard set out in Thornburg is best summarized as follows:
Only the prerequisites are essential to plaintiffs' case. No particular
aggregate of the other Senate report factors is so essential that the
failure to establish some, or even all, of the remaining factors is
necessarily fatal to the plaintiffs' case. Likewise, no one factor,
including the absence of any minority elected officials, mandates a
finding of dilution. If, based on the existence of the Thornburg
prerequisites, and the totality of the circumstances, it appears that
minorities are denied an equal opportunity to participate in the
political process, then the election of some candidates preferred by

89. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1282 (1989) (demonstrating the ease
with which the distinction is blurred between proportional representation overcoming a finding
of dilution as a matter of law, and the absence of proportional representation being deemed
significant to a finding of dilution). The lower court's determination for the defendants was
remanded for reconsideration in light of Thornburg. On remand, the court noted:
WUnder Gingles, a Section 2 claim will be defeated if the black community is
proportionally represented, notwithstanding any other factor ... On remand, this
Court must determine as a factual matter whether black electoral success in Norfolk
"has been so consistent and nearly proportional as to overshadow any racially
polarized voting and other factors tending to dilute minority access."
Collins v. City of Norfolk, 679 F. Supp. 565, 580-81 (1970).
The lower court reaffirmed its finding in favor of the defendants and also concluded that
the plaintiffs had achieved proportional representation. Id. A majority of the court of appeals
panel reversed, based on its finding that the lower court's determination of proportional
representation was clearly erroneous. Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1282, 1303 (1989).
The panel failed to note the distinction between the case before it-a case in which the lower
court found no dilution-and Thornburg-a case in which the Supreme Court actually
overturned a finding of dilution by the lower court. Consistent proportional representation is
a defense to dilution. The absence of proportional representation, however, clearly does not
equal dilution. In light of the lower court's determination that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the at-large system did not dilute black voting strength, the effect of the court
of appeals opinion was to reverse the use made of proportional representation by Thornburg.
Instead of the existence of proportional representation constituting a defense for the city, its
absence became the basis for recovery by the plaintiffs.

640
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the minority will not negate that finding unless those candidates
have enjoyed a level of success equivalent to that found in District
23 of Thornburg. The ultimate conclusion of dilution is a question
of fact, and will be reversed on appeal only if clearly erroneous. 90
IV.

SHOULD SECTION

2 BE EXTENDED TO PROTECT THE VOTING

STRENGTH OF "COALITIONS"?

The essence of a racial vote dilution claim is that members of a
previously disfranchised minority group have been denied an opportunity to participate in the political process because of their minority
status. The group members' common history of discrimination leads
to shared political interests often not embraced by the majority. Atlarge elections thwart their efforts to elect representatives who would
further these interests because their numbers alone are insufficient
to elect anyone, and white voters will not provide assistance. The
bond of a shared history of discrimination based on race creates the
common political interests. Racist attitudes prevent the minority
group from engaging in the same coalition building as other interest
groups that can take advantage of numbers. The dominance of
discrimination and racism as causative factors in the creation of the
group, and the disability it experiences in the political process
distinguish groups protected by the Voting Rights Act from other
ethnic groups whose members also share a common political agenda. 9'
How well does the notion of a "cognizable minority group" with
particularized "group" political interests transfer to the notion of a
"cognizable coalition" made up of two or more separate and distinct
minorities? Aside from the very substantial practical problems, did

90. A very important aspect of the Thornburg decision has generally been ignored by the

lower courts. The key point on which all the justices agreed was that the ultimate conclusion
of "dilution" was one of fact, to be reversed only if clearly erroneous. Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 70-74 (1986). Four members of the Court, those who joined Justice O'Connor's
opinion, were highly critical of several aspects of the lower court's decision. It seems clear
that had the lower court concluded that dilution was not present, at least these four, and
quite probably a majority of the Court, still would have voted to affirm. The enormous
discretion vested in the trial court leaves open the possibility that a different judge could reach
the opposite conclusion on facts very similar to those in Thornburg.
91. This paragraph states the "conventional wisdom" that is generally thought to support
special "group-based" protection for minority groups that have been victims of discrimination.
Of course, the conventional wisdom is not always correct. Not all groups who have occupied
disfavored positions in American society become politically cohesive as a result of their shared
experience. Nor have all groups that have suffered discrimination been impaired in their ability
to participate in the political process. A group seeking relief under Section 2 must prove that
the conventional wisdom actually is true for their situation.
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Congress envision that Section 2 would be available to rearrange
state and local election structures for the benefit a political coalition?
A. Did Congress Intend to Protect "Coalitions" Made Up of
Separate Protected Groups?
The voluminous legislative history surrounding the amendment to
Section 2 contains no reference to a "coalition" suit. It seems very
unlikely that anyone had such suits in mind when the amendment
was debated. All indications are that Congress enacted the amendment in an effort to restore the standards of the pre-Bolden cases,
none of which involved an effort to create a single district for
minorities from separate racial or ethnic groups. Several cases,
including White itself, involved claims of dilution by two minorities.
In these cases, however, each group sought its own remedy. The
overwhelming majority of pre-Bolden cases were brought by single
minority groups that clearly had the numbers and geographic compactness to control at least one single member district.
That blacks and Hispanics were considered to be separate groups
entitled to the opportunity to "participate in the political process
and to elect candidates of their choice," regardless of the effectiveness of the other group's participation, is clear from the history of
the Voting Rights Act. The original Act, passed in 1965, was aimed
at enfranchisement of blacks in the South. The legislative history is
directed toward documentation of the discrimination suffered by
blacks primarily at the hands of the governments and white citizens
of the deep South. The Act's most stringent provisions were to
apply only in those states, although the formula for coverage of
these provisions picked up a handful of non-southern counties. None
of the "covered" jurisdictions had substantial Hispanic populations,
with the possible exception of four counties in Arizona, which were
allowed to "bail-out," i.e., exempt themselves from the Act's special
provisions. Thus, Hispanics were not considered to be part of the
nation's populations that needed the special protection of the Act. 92
Clearly they were not thought to be blacks, or as so similarly situated
as to require the same treatment.

92. The only Hispanics given special protection by the 1965 Act were Puerto Ricans
residing in New York but educated in Puerto Rico. Voting Rights Acts of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, § 4, 96 Stat. 140, 142 (codified or amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4(e) (1982)) (designed to
allow this group to "pass" the New York literacy requirement).
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Another ten years passed before the special protection of the
Voting Rights Act was extended to Hispanics. 93 The 1975 amendments to the Act were designed to enfranchise language minorities

who had been deprived of effective political participation by the use
of English-only elections. The primary target of the 1975 Act was
Texas, and, to a lesser extent, California. 94 The special provisions

of the 1975 Act were to apply in any jurisdiction that had the
following characteristics: (1) more than five percent of the 1970
population belonged to a single language minority group; (2) fewer
than fifty percent of the citizens of voting age voted in the 1972

presidential election; and (3) the election was conducted in English
only.
The vehicle for discrimination against Hispanics was thought by

Congress to be that the election process was closed to those who
did not understand English. 95 This is evident not only from the
coverage formula, but also from the fact that another part of the
1975 Act provides that some jurisdictions must provide election
materials in the language of certain minority groups.
Prior to passage of the 1975 Act, problems of language and
cultural incompatibility were recognized as the basis for treating
Mexican-Americans as a group eligible for special protection, in-

cluding protection from dilution of their voting strength. The lower
court in White v. Regester recognized that Mexican-Americans in
Texas suffered from appalling conditions of poverty, exacerbated by

93. To an ethnologist, a suit brought by Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans would be
a suit brought by separate minority groups. Although both groups are labelled "Hispanics,"
they share little more than a common language. For purposes of the Voting Rights Act,
however, the two groups "needed" special protection for the same reason: they were at a
disadvantage in their utilization of the political process because of their lack of facility in
English.
94. Hunter, The 1975 Voting Rights Act and Language Minorities, 25 CArs. U.L. REv.
250, 254-56 (1976).
95. S. REP. No. 94-295, Voting Rights Act Extension, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Sess. 24 (1975), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMun.
NEvs 774, 790. But see A. TBERNsRoM, supra note 25, at 54-62. Dr. Therstrom argues that
the "hidden agenda" of the extension of the Voting Rights Act to Texas was not the elimination
of problems of disfranchisement caused by English-only elections-an issue upon which very
little hard evidence was introduced at the extension hearings. Rather, she says, the real purpose
of the Act's sponsors was to subject redistricting decisions to the scrutiny of Section 5, (the
provision of the Voting Rights Act that requires all changes in election laws in certain
jurisdictions to be federally approved prior to their implementation), and thereby pressure

jurisdictions to create more opportunities for Mexican-American office holding. "Preclearance
of all districting plans-whether for local; state, or national office-would undoubtedly alter
the level of Hispanic officeholding ... With districting plans drawn under the watchful eye
of the Justice Department, the number of 'safe' minority seats was bound to rise." Id. at 58.
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often insurmountable cultural disorientation. 6 The court noted, "[t]he
fact that they are reared in a sub-culture in which a dialect of
Spanish is the primary language provides permanent impediments to
their educational and vocational advancement and creates other
traumatic problems. '" 97 The court found it easy to make a connection
between language and educational disabilities and depressed political
participation. "There is no aspect of human endeavor, in general
and of American life in particular, in which the ability to read,
write and understand a language is more important than politics." 9
In the opinion of the court, Mexican-Americans were distinguishable
from other language groups in that they had been victims of discrimination by way of Texas' poll tax, and "the most restrictive
voter registration procedures in the nation.'' 99
Blacks and Mexican-Americans thus theoretically required the
protection of the Voting Rights Act for different reasons-blacks
because of a legacy of discrimination that had its origins in slavery,
and Mexican-Americans because of disabilities caused by cultural
and language disabilities. While clearly either group could bring a
dilution suit, the theory behind such suits is that the group had been
fenced out of the political process by virtue of it status as a racial
or ethnic minority, and for the reasons that justified the special
protection afforded the group by the Act. Ethnic groups, such as
Irish, Italians, and Iranians are not entitled to protection because
there was no congressional finding that their ethnicity had subjected
them to disfranchisement, or that English-only elections had hampered their political participation. Interest groups-Republicans, environmentalists, fundamentalists, etc.-are not entitled to the claim
dilution either. The ultimate basis for the claim must be that of
deprivation of equal political participation because of race or membership in a protected language minority group. 100
Had Congress considered the issue, would it have viewed blacks
and Mexican-Americans who claim dilution of their combined voting

96.

Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd sub nom., White v.

Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
97. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. at 730.
98. Id. at 731.

99. Id.
100. Indeed, the difference between the two "grandfather" cases in the area of vote
dilution. Compare Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (plaintiffs lost because they were
just Democrats whose political fortunes rose and fell with those of other Democrats) with
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (plaintiffs won because electoral defeat was due to
their being black and Hispanic).
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strength as being like a group brought together by a political agenda
not currently shared by a majority of the jurisdiction's voters? Or
would Congress have seen the coalition as being more like a discrete
minority disabled by racism from utilizing its numbers to ameliorate
their condition through the political process?
B.

The Response of the Lower Courts

Most courts faced with coalition dilution cases have simply assumed that there was no legal barrier to two groups seeking to be
one for purposes of Section 2.101 Only Judge Higginbotham of the
5th Circuit is on record as recognizing the significant "leap" involved
in extending the protection of Section 2 beyond a single minority.
Judge Higginbotham dissented from the affirmation on appeal of
two Texas cases in which the lower court had allowed blacks and
Hispanics to combine their numbers to bring suit. 10 2 He expressed
alarm that the protection of the Voting Rights Act had been extended
"by fiat" to a "newly defined minority-a coalition of blacks and
Browns" with no citation to any authority that suggested Congress
intended such a result, and with no reasoning to support the extension.103
In Campos v. City of Baytown, the panel had justified the
extension through negative implication:
There is nothing in the law that prevents the plaintiffs from
identifying the protected aggrieved minority to include both blacks
and Hispanics. Section 1973(a) [Section 2] protects the right to
vote of both racial and language minorities . . . If, together, they
are of such numbers residing geographically so as to constitute a
majority in a single member district, they cross the [Thornburg]
threshold as potentially disadvantaged voters.1 4

101. See Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989); Romero v. City of
Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (coalition dilution cases in which plaintiffs were
denied relief on the ground that they had failed to demonstrate that blacks and Hispanics
were politically cohesive). See also Latino Political Action Comm. v. City of Boston, 609 F.
Supp. 739, 747 (D.C. Mass. 1985) (court refused to create a district made up of Boston's
various minority groups).
102. Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 921, 943 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane), (reh'g
denied) (Higginbotham, J., Gee, J., Garwood, J., Jolly, J., Davis, J., and Jones, J., dissenting);
LULAC v. Midland Indep. School Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1503 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting) vacated 829 F.2d 546 (1987).
103. Campos, 849 F.2d at 944-45 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
104. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1986).
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In the other case, LULAC v. Midland Independent School District,01
neither the lower court nor the panel discussed whether the definition
of minority "group" should include a coalition of two groups. The

lower court recognized that blacks and Hispanics are racially and
culturally distinct, but thought that refusing to allow the two groups

to aggregate their numbers to satisfy Thornburg would be "inherently unjust." The appellate panel justified aggregation of the groups
on the grounds that both groups had been victims of Anglo discrim-

ination.'06 Ignoring the conceptual problems with this thesis, both
courts decided that any problems with aggregation should be resolved

by asking whether the two groups were "politically cohesive."' 0 7
Judge Higginbotham pointed out the fallacy in the assumption

that separate disadvantaged groups who may from time to time
display "political cohesiveness" are necessarily entitled to claim
special protection for their coalition. He noted that the purpose of
the Act was to redress racial and ethnic discrimination in the political
process. The Thornburg inquiry:
assumes a group unified by race or national origin and asks if it
is cohesive in its voting. If a minority group lacks a common race
or ethnicity, cohesion must rely principally on shared values, socio-

economic factors, and coalition formation, making the group almost indistinguishable from political minorities as opposed to racial
minorities.' 0
Arguing in Campos that the issue deserved en banc consideration, 0 9
Judge Higginbotham pointed out that to ask whether the Voting

105. 648 F. Supp. 596, 618 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
106. LULAC, 812 F.2d at 1500. Neither court explored the question of whether the two
groups became "one" because they shared similar discrimination at the hands of the majority,
or whether the two groups had formed a political coalition for the convenience of the moment.

Id.
107. Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d at 936. A similar conclusion was reached in
Concerned Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee County, Civ. App. No. 86-209-CIV-T-17
(M.D. Fla. April 24, 1989) (Mem. Op.). In ConcernedCitizens, the court held that Thornburg
had:
defined a Section 2 Minority in terms of its 'cohesiveness' rather than a simple
ethnic or racial association. A minority group which exists in close economic, social
and cultural proximity, cannot be a Section 2 Minority if it is not politically cohesive.
But two minorities, generally considered separate identifiable groups, may be a single
Section 2 minority if they behave in a politically cohesive manner.
Id. at 20-21. The court found for the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated "cohesiveness." Id.
108. LULAC, 812 F.2d at 1504 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
109. A peculiar procedural irony prevented en banc consideration of this case. Three judges
recused themselves from the deliberations of the case, apparently because of a close relationship
with the defendant-appellant's attorney. A majority (six of eleven) of those who considered
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Rights Act prohibited two groups from seeking protection for their
coalitional voting strength was to ask the wrong question. Rather
the question should be whether Congress intended to protect coalitions. The fact that both groups are protected does not justify the
assumption that a new group composed of both minorities is itself
a protected minority. "A group tied by overlapping political agendas
but not tied by the same statutory disability is no more than a
political alliance or coalition." 0

Judge Higginbotham's concerns are justified. A statute designed
to counteract the effects of racial discrimination in the political
process should not be interpreted so as to protect what may be
nothing more than ordinary interest group politics. When two distinct
groups join together for purposes of achieving political goals, the
result is more likely to be coalition politics, rather than the creation
of a new "discrete and insular minority."
For the courts to resolve the question of whether a "coalition"
is protected by Section 2 by asking whether the two groups are
politically cohesive is essentially to ignore the question. If no additional burden is placed on a coalition seeking protection than is
imposed on a group that clearly is entitled to recover if it can
establish its claim, including that its members are politically cohesive,
the effect is to assume, quite illogically, that minorities are fungible.
A thousand blacks are the legal equivalent of 500 blacks and 300
Hispanics, 150 Indians, and 50 Vietnamese.
C. Is There a Basis to Recognize a "Coalition" as a "Group"
Protected by the Act?
Absent congressional guidance, the issue of protection for coalitions should be resolved by reference to the general evil which the
amendment to Section 2 addressed-exclusion from meaningful political participation because of racism. By its expressed intention to
recognize both Whitcomb and White, Congress indicated its belief
that not all failure of candidates identified with minority groups is
the product of racial discrimination. Minority candidates lose for

the request were prepared to grant it. However, according to the Fifth Circuit rules, a positive
vote to consider must come from a majority of all active judges, including those who declined
to participate.
110. Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d at 921, 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1988) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting).
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the same reasons that other candidates lose. Relief is to be afforded
only those who lose for reasons that are not normal, but rather are
tied to discrimination and racism."'
To the extent that the coalition is the product of shared concerns
stemming from essentially similar discriminatory treatment at the
hands of the majority, dilution of its voting strength would seem to
be within the ambit of Section 2. The basis for the coalition,
however, should be crucial. The Voting Rights Act's purpose was
to eliminate racial discrimination-not to foster particular political
coalitions. The constitutionality of the Act is tied to its purpose as
a device to prevent racial discrimination, and to remedy the effects
of past discrimination. A coalition based on a similar political
agenda, one drawn from perhaps shared socio-economic status, or
neighborhood concerns is not one for which Section 2 should provide
protection. Were the rule otherwise, then any coalition could seek
Section 2 relief, so long as some number of its members were
"protected" minorities.
Thornburg recognized that there are inherent limitations on the
ability of any group, racial or otherwise, to influence the political
process. Among the "normal" reasons for failure of a group to
elect candidates of its choice is group size. In politics, numbers
count. Some groups are too small to expect a seat in the legislative
body. These groups may not be able to elect a candidate primarily
identified with the group, but instead may have to compromise by
voting for candidates with a broader base of support who promises
to be responsive to the group's concerns.
A racial group that becomes a political group should be subject
to the same political constraints as others who would utilize the
political process. A group that is too small to be expected to win a
seat, were it a purely political group, cannot legitimately have
heightened expectations because the basis for the group's existence

111.

One defensible position is that when the Supreme Court referred to a "politically

cohesive minority group," it meant just that-a minority group that was politically cohesive.
A "group" is generally defined by both internal and external recognition of its existence. The
group members "are viewed as a group; they view themselves as a group; their identity is in
large part determined by membership in the group; their social status is linked to the status
of the group; and much of our action, both institutional and personal, is based on these
perceptions." Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Pm. Pun. Asi. 107, 148
(1976). Quite clearly then, by this definition, a "group" cannot be made up of MexicanAmericans and blacks, and except by aid of their amalgamation into "Hispanics" by Congress,
Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans also could not qualify as a group.
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is tied to the race of its members. 112 On the one hand, a "coalition"
dilution suit that is merely an attempt by one or both groups involved
to avoid the Thornburg size limitation should not be within the
protection of Section 2.
On the other hand, Section 2 is classic "remedial" legislation,
and therefore should be liberally construed." 3 Under this rationale,
if past discrimination and present racial attitudes prevent the groups
from utilizing their voting coalition, which exists primarily because
the two groups share common concerns and political interest derived
from similar discriminatory treatment at the hands of the majority,
the coalition should be entitled to the protection of Section 2. To
"qualify" as a new "minority," however, the group should demonstrate that the "coalition" is not one merely of convenience for
the limited purpose of bringing the suit. Thus, to seek protection
for a "coalition" the plaintiffs should demonstrate that the two
groups are indeed "one," and that the reason for their status as a

112. Technically, "proportional representation" is achieved when the percentage of the
votes a political party receives is equal to the percentage of those elected who are party
candidates. Countries and the few local jurisdictions in the United States that employ proportional representation systems do not generally use race as a basis for designating representatives.
See generally A. LuPHART, PRoPoRnONAnTY BY NoN-PR METHODS: ETHNIc REPRESENTATION
N BELGIUM, CYPRUS, LEBANON, NEW ZEALAND, WEST GERMANY, AND ZIMBABWE (1985);
ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR PoLrrcL CONSEQUENCES (B. Groffman & A. Lijphart eds.,
1986).
Unless representatives are to be allocated on the basis of race, the term "proportional
representation" cannot be meaningfully applied to a jurisdiction and the percentage of elected
officials who are minorities. In the minds of minorities, the courts, and even the general
public, however, there appears to be a notion that "all things being equal" the racial makeup
of an elected body should roughly mirror that of the population-although quite clearly such
"mirroring" is not seen in other population characteristics, such as sex, occupation, or religion.
A group comprising less than a "seat's worth" of the jurisdiction's population (i.e., the
population necessary to support a district for one-person, one-vote purposes), arguably should
not be seen as legitimate dilution candidate. Racial dilution cases are a loose extrapolation of
the principle of one-person, one-vote. See generally Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds v.
Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 34 HASTiNGS L.J. 1 (1982). For one-person, one-vote
purposes, the population necessary to support a seat is equal to the total population divided
by the number of sats. If the minority population is insufficient to support a seat by its
numbers alone, it must "share" that seat with some number of others. Also, considered from
the layman's perspective of "mirroring," a group that is only ten percent of the population
of a district in which twenty percent is needed to support a seat seems to lack firm justification
for a claim to "its own" seat.
113. The counter argument is that this legislation seriously strains traditional notions of

federalism by intruding significantly upon the prerogative of the states to determine the
methods by which local governments should be elected-a matter in which the courts have
generally been loath to interfere. In the words of Judge Higginbotham (see discussion, infra
note 181), "[p]laying with the structure of local government in an effort to channel political
factions is a heady game; we should insist that Congress speak plainly when it would do so."
Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 944, 945 (5th Cir. 1987).
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"combined" discrete minority is their shared discriminatory treatment at the hands of the majority.
Perhaps the litmus test should be whether the two groups consider
themselves one under circumstances when each group can benefit
separately. For example, did the Hispanics who now claim to be
"one" with blacks count blacks as Hispanics, and vice versa, when
deciding whether affirmative action was necessary to increase minority hiring or admission to competitive programs? Or, more directly on point, in other districting decisions involving both groups
did the two agree to "share" a district, if a district could have been
114
created for each?
In Overton v. City of Austin, 115 the circumstances surrounding
the bringing of the suit and the position of the "individual" groups
in the litigation were indications that the two groups were hardly
"one." The suit had been filed originally by a group of black
plaintiffs; a group of Hispanics intervened. Thornburg was decided
while the case was on appeal from a decision for the defendants.
On remand, to demonstrate that the "minorities" could constitute
a majority of a single member district as required by Thornburg,
the black plaintiffs proposed one plan containing a "minority district" that was 50.701o black, and 13.9% Mexican-American, and a
second with a district that was 60.601 black, and 14.7% MexicanAmerican. The Mexican-American plaintiffs proposed one plan containing a district that was 51.5% Mexican-American, and 8% black,
and another with a district that was 57.49% Mexican-American, and
8.45% black. Nevertheless, both groups argued that their numbers
should be combined to meet the threshold of Thornburg."6
The trial judge refused the plaintiff's proposal on the ground that
they had not demonstrated political cohesiveness .1 7 A decision to
the contrary, and a subsequent victory for the plaintiffs would have
presented an interesting dilemma. Would the court have "cured"
the dilution of the coalitions vote by accepting the black dominated

114.

For example, Hispanics in a -challenged county may lack the geographic compactness

to make up a majority of a district in the county's legislative body, but may in combination
with Hispanics from neighboring counties have the numbers necessary to control a state
legislative district. Did Hispanics argue for the creation of an Hispanic district, or were they
just as willing to be 30% of a district that was also 30% black?
115. Civ. No. A-84-CA-189 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 15, 1987) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).

116.

Id. at 26.

117.

Id. at 28. The court also ruled that at least a "voting age majority" was necessary

to satisfy Thornburg, so that neither group "qualified" based solely on its own numbers. Id.
at 24.
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district, or the Hispanic dominated district? If in subsequent years
one of the group's numbers becomes sufficient to control a district
by its numbers alone, could it then insist upon "its own" district?
The "group"

should also demonstrate that it is the discriminatory

behavior of the majority that has made them "one," and not merely
political interests that they may share with any number of other
groups, such as other Democrats, or poor people, or their neighbors.
Perhaps in some parts of the Southwest the two groups were lumped
together and treated as "one" by the white majority. Discriminatory
housing restrictions may have forced the two groups to live together
in barrios. Schools may have been segregated into "Anglos" and
"non-Anglos." Isolation from Anglos, and forced close contact with
each other may have increased the normally very low social interaction between blacks and Mexican-Americans.
Such circumstances, however, are likely to be the exception and
not the rule. Often one group has been in place for several generations, while the second group has arrived more recently. Hardee
County, Florida, a jurisdiction against which a coalition suit was
brought, is a good example. The County's small black population
had occupied the same two neighborhoods for generations. Ninety
percent of the county's black population lived in one or the other.
Hispanics, primarily Mexican-American migrant workers, began arriving in the mid-1960's. Gradually, more and more of the migrants
settled permanently in the county. Very few moved into the black
neighborhoods. Almost all lived in census areas that were majority
white-Anglo. The differential marriage rates between Hispanics and
Anglos, and Hispanics and blacks provided evidence of substantial
interaction of Hispanics with whites, not blacks. Over twenty-eight
percent of marriages involving Hispanics were to Anglos, and virtually none were to blacks. Blacks in the county could claim to have
been victims of some state-imposed past discrimination in housing,
education, and employment. Hispanics, however, could point to no
state-sanctioned discrimination in Florida, or in the county. Any
connection between present depressed levels of education and income
for Hispanics and present or past discrimination was extremely
tenuous. In short, any interest the two groups shared was by virtue
of their somewhat similar socio-economic status, (a condition also
shared with a large segment of the white population), 118 and not

118.

As a group, blacks and Hispanics were clearly poor. 57.8% of blacks, and 48.9% of
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because they had shared similar mistreatment at the hands of the
White-Anglo majority of the county. 119
Mere proof that the two groups were at times victims of discrimination is not sufficient to conclude the often vast differences in
experience and attitudes that separate racial and ethnic groups have
been overcome. For example, the ancestors of many Japanese now
living in California were forced to live in concentration camps during
World War II, even though they were American citizens. Today
Japanese college-age students charge that colleges discriminate against
them by using Asian "quotas." Many blacks now living in California
moved west to escape Jim Crow practices in the South. Even in less
overtly racist California, blacks were frequently victims of discrimination in employment, housing, and the provision of health care.
In short, both groups have been victims of past discrimination. Yet
few would suggest that Japanese and blacks are "fungible."
While there may have been greater similarity in the means of
discrimination and its effects in the case of blacks and MexicanAmericans, little evidence exists that the two groups have consolidated into one as a result of any commonality in their experience.
To be sure, both groups are disproportionately poor, and less well
educated than other Americans. Plaintiffs arguing for the existence
of a "coalition" often assert that the two groups share similar lower
socio-economic status because of past discrimination factors which
make blacks and Mexican-Americans "natural" political partners. 20

Hispanics lived below the poverty line. In sheer numbers however, there were more poor
whites. More than half of the persons below the poverty level were white. 1980 CENsus OF
POPULATION AND HousiNr, GENERAL SociAL AND EcoNoWsc CHAR.ACraRIsncs, PC80-I-Cll,
FLORIDA, Table 187.
119. Concerned Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee County, Civ. App. No. 86-209-CIV-

T-17 (M.D. Fla. April 24, 1989) (Mem. Op.) at 28-30 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
120. A causal relationship between past discrimination and present lower socio-economic
status is generally assumed to exist, even though the majority of all poor and poorly educated

people are white. Taken to its illogical conclusion, we would assume that minorities are poor
because they have been victims of discrimination, but whites are poor for the "normal"
reasons. A more realistic position is that most of the "causes" of poverty are the same for
all groups, but are more prevalent among minorities. For example, marriage and parenthood

at a young age are factors that tend to reduce educational opportunity and earning potential,
regardless of race or ethnicity. These conditions are far more prevalent among blacks and
Hispanics than among Jews and Asians, groups which enjoy higher than average median family

incomes. See generally T. SowELL, Erm c AmERICA (2d ed. 1981).
To be sure, controlling for production factors and other important variables only reduces
the gap in income between whites and Mexican-Americans and Blacks. The remaining gap is
more justifiably attributed to past discrimination. Although even here the logic is less than

perfect. Those employing the scientific method do not ordinarily assume that differences not
readily explained by existing variables must be attributed to discrimination. Just as logically,
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However, social scientists recognize, that the factors contributing
to their lower than average socio-economic status are different for

the two groups.121 Social scientists who have studied Mexican-Americans generally agree that the group has a unique history. Their
experiences are not particularly comparable to those of European
immigrants, and are quite different from those of blacks. 22 For
Mexican-Americans, the factors that contribute most directly to
lower socio-economic status are: Low educational attainment; low
levels of English proficiency; 23 an age structure that is disproportionally young; 24 large families, slightly more of which are headed

remaining differences can be explained by as yet unidentified variables. A more appealing
argument might be that some of the variables affecting income potential are themselves the
product of past discrimination.
121. Id. at 111-15. Sowell and others maintain that ethnic groups differ widely in certain
characteristics, which are themselves sufficient to account for income and status differentials
among the groups, without resort to discrimination as an explanatory variable. Among these
characteristics are the age distribution within the group, age of first marriage and parenthood,
fertility rates, and historical and cultural orientation toward education and occupations. See
generally BLOCK & WALTER, DISCRIMINATION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND EQUAL OPPoRTUNT
(1982). The diversity in socio-economic status among the different groups making up the
amalgamated group "Hispanics" demonstrates the importance of these characteristics. Cubans,
who are older as a group than other Hispanics, are more likely to be part of two parent, two
wage-earner families, were better educated at the time of their immigration, and had an
average annual income of $21,300 in 1981. The average income of Puerto Ricans amounted
to only $11,400. Among Hispanics groups, Puerto Ricans were the least educated; the least
likely to have two wage earners in the family; and the most likely to have come from broken
homes, or to be raised by an unwed mother. GANN & DuiGAN, supra note 6, at 318-19.
122. See generally Horowitz, Conflict and Accommodation, Mexican-Americans in the
Cosmopolis, MEXICAN AhmRiCANS IN COMPARATIE PERsPECTVE 58 (1985) [hereinafter, Horowitz].
123. Most studies have confirmed the obvious negative impact of the inability to speak
English. A recent article summarized some of the finding: "There is little doubt that Englishlanguage proficiency is essential for success in the U.S. labor market ... especially for gaining
entry into some of the higher-status positions . . . failure to gain command of English during
adolescence may result in truncated educational experiences ... linguistic minorities do not
compete well with English proficient majority groups." Tienda & Neidert, Language, Education,
and the Socioeconomic Achievement of Hispanic Origin Men, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 359, 390 (R. De La Garza ed. 1985). According to one scholar, a Department of
Labor Study found no significant differences in the wages between Anglos and Hispanics in
the most English-proficient categories. Horowitz, supra note 122, at 80. Another scholar
utilizing the same data, however, concluded that "lack of fluency in speaking and understanding
English does not definitely lower wage offers in all cases. While the estimates do suggest that
English difficulties lower wage offers (within groups having the same levels of education and
time in the United States) the margin of error in these estimates is large." Reimers, The Wage
Structure of Hispanic Men: Implicationsfor Policy, in Tim MEXICAN AmERIcAN EXPERIENCE
101, 126 (R. De La Garza ed. 1985). Reimers also concluded that "English skills per se make
very little difference in wages among Mexican origin men within age and nativity group,
immigration cohort, and educational level." Id. at 129.
124. In 1980, the median age in the Mexican origin population was 21.9 years, compared
to 30.0 years for the total United States population. A much greater proportion of the over
eighteen portion of the Mexican origin population is in the 20 to 29 age range, due in large
part to the high concentration of males in that age category migrating from Mexico. Bean,
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by females than is true for the population generally; 12 and a tradition
of early marriage and parenthood, factors which limit opportunities
for educational advancement.
Aggregate data present a misleading picture of the status of

Mexican-Americans because of the inclusion of the most poverty
prone group-legal and illegal immigrants recently arrived from
Mexico. 126 A substantial number of these migrants are economic
refugees, many with very little education and few job skills. Some
are migrant farm workers, who maintain strong ties with Mexico,
thereby lessening the more typical tendency of immigrants to assimilate.' 27 Their migratory existence diminishes the opportunity for
their children to "move up" the economic ladder. Children of
migrants have difficulty staying in school because of frequent family
moves to follow the crops and because of pressure to add their
128
hands to the family labor pool.
The economic picture is likely to be brighter for second and third
generation Mexican-Americans.' 29 Educational attainment is

Stephen, & Opitz, The Mexican Origin Population in the United States: A demographic
Overview in THE MExICAN AmmiUcAN EXPERIENCE 57, 60-63 (De ]a Garza ed. 1985).
125. Mexican origin families average 4.14 persons per family, compared to 3.27 for tle
general population. Of these families, 16.4% are headed by females, compared with 14.3%
for the total United States population. Id. at 65-66.
126. Census Bureau personnel estimate that of the 8.7 million Mexican-Americans counted
in the 1980 Census, 1.1 million were undocumented aliens. Warren & Passel, A Count of the
Uncountable: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 Census, U.S. Bureau
of Census Photocopy.
127. The United State Justice Department estimated that almost 65,000 persons per year
legally inmmigrated to the United States from Mexico between 1970 and 1980. STAlIsTICAL
YERBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1981). Perhaps as many as
one-third eventually return to Mexico. BEAN, STEPBEN, & OPiTz, The Mexican Origin Populations in the United States: A DemographicOverview, in TaE MEXICAN AmERiCAN EXPERIENCE
57, 59 (1985) (De La Garza ed., 1985). Return migration is probably even higher among illegal
immigrants.
128. The farm worker migrant will play an increasingly less significant role in the overall
socio-economic statistics for Mexican-Americans. As of 1980, 79% of Mexican-Americans lived
in metropolitan areas. GANN & DUIGAN, supra, note 6 at 318.
129. Horowitz summarizes studies from the late 70's and early 80's, which show considerable
intragenerational and intergenerational change. "First generation immigrants demonstrate little
occupational mobility, but much improvement of income level in the course of working lives
... A California study shows intergenerational occupational mobility to be common: Fifteen
percent of the first generation of Mexican-Americans were in white-collar jobs, compared to
27.4 percent of the second generation and 36.7 percent of the third. Third-generation median
income as of 1970 was 74 percent higher than first-generation median income." Horowitz,
supra note 84, at 73. Researches studying the impact of Mexican immigration into California
concluded that later generations achieved higher levels of educations which they were able to
translate into upward occupational mobility. K. McCarthy & R. Valdez, CURRENT AND FUTURE
EFFEcTs OF MEXICAN IMIIGRATION IN CALIFORNIA 60 (1986).
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greater. 13 0 Increases in education generally lead to smaller families.'
Poverty among blacks is more intransigent. Despite the well publicized increases in the black middle class in recent years, intergen-

erational improvement in social status is not common. Moreover,
black poverty is less influenced by increased education. Blacks, with
a median of 12.3 years of schooling for those aged twenty-five and
older, are closing the educational gap between themselves and white
Americans, for whom the 1980 median years of schooling completed
was 12.7 years. 32 Unfortunately, this has not translated into similar
gains in median family income. The 1980 Census reports that black
median family income was only 60.5% of white median family
income. Hispanic median family income was 70.6% of white median
family income, with Mexican-American family income being slightly
higher than that for Hispanics generally. (The median years of

education completed for Mexican-Americans is 11.5).133

Family disorganization-divorce, single-parent families, children
living with grandparents, and unwed, often teenage, mothers-is

significantly more prevalent among blacks than among MexicanAmericans and explains some of the differences observed in median
family income between the two groups, as well as the higher level
34
of dependency of blacks on welfare and other social services.1

130. Horowitz notes: "There is no doubt that Mexican Americans overall have low levels
of education, but these are in large part an artifact of ongoing immigration of uneducated
adults from Mexico, and they also mask the much higher levels prevailing in younger age
cohorts." Horowitz, supra note 84, at 72. See also K. McCarthy & R. Valdez, CuRRENT AND
FTrRu

EFFECTS OF MEXICAN IMMIORATION IN CAmIoRNI

56-60 (1986).

131. Mexican origin women show declining fertility rates with increased years of education.
Moreover, native-born Mexican origin women have fewer children at all educational levels
than do their cohorts born in Mexico, although their fertility rates still exceed those of Anglos.
Bean, Stephen, & Opitz, supra note 86, at 64-65.
132. SoWvELL, supra note 120, at 324.
133. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, STATiSTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIM
UNITED STATES 1987 at 121.
134. In 1975, Sowell observed that:
Even though the number of American children living in poverty declined sharply
during the 1960's, this was not true for children living in families headed by a
woman-whether that woman was black or white. In short, the disorganized poor
are not being lifted out of poverty, even though society as a whole-and especially
minorities-may be advancing economically. Well-organized families, with both
parents present, not only advanced economically but, outside the South, the younger
(under 35) Negro families in this category actually overtook white families in the
same category in income in 1970. In general, the Negro population is simultaneously
advancing in the upper-income and occupational levels and retrogressing at the lower
socioeconomic levels in terms of hard-core unemployment and increasing proportions
of broken homes.
T. SowvELL, RACE AND ECONOhHCS 156 (1975).
Nearly 10 years later, in 1984, Harvard political economist Glenn Loury observed that the
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Controlling for these variables diminishes differences in family income for the three groups.

In short, the chief characteristic that blacks and Mexican-Americans have in common-disproportionate representation among the
poor-has, aside from possible discrimination, different contributing
causes. Those differences are sufficient to overcome the common
concerns brought about by poverty, thus mitigating against a shared
political agenda. There is a greater likelihood that the two groups

will be competitors for scarce resources, than that they will see
united political action as a means for both groups to escape poverty. 135 At any rate, the issue is sufficiently in doubt that shared

economic status should not be seen as the basis for merging the two
groups.

Another reason often given for seeing the two groups as one is
their shared exclusion from white society. Here too, the differences
in the experiences of the two groups are greater than their similarities.
In most areas Mexican-Americans were not as rigidly segregated into
identifiable neighborhoods as were blacks in the South.'36 In fact,
the primary obstacle to Mexican-Americans bringing vote dilution

trend identified by Sowell had escalated. Loury observed that differences in earnings between
young, well educated black and white workers had diminished dramatically, and that something
close to parity in economic status had been achieved for young intact black families. At the
same time, the black underclass was growing at an alarming rate. He described the group,
consisting of at least one third of the black population, as mired in social pathologies. Young
men leave school at age 16, and often reach their mid-20's without having held a steady job.

More than half the babies in some underclass neighborhoods are born out of wedlock. Black
girls between the age of 15 and 19 are the most fertile population of that age group in the
industrialized world, with birth rates twice as high as any other group of women in the West.
In 1984, nearly three of every five black children did not live with both parents. Almost half
of black children are supported in part by the state and federal government. Loury, A New
American Dilemma, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 31, 1984, at 14.

135. Peter Skerry of the American Enterprise Institute notes that blacks frequently perceive
affirmative action programs for Hispanics as a threat to black interests. For example, blacks
opposed Los Angeles County's decision to increase Hispanic employment in county jobs, and
black leaders were reluctant to endorse extending the coverage of the Voting Rights Act to
Hispanics. Skerry, Immigration and Affirmative-Action Studies, 96 PUBLic INTEREsT 86, 93,
102 (Summer 1989). Dr. Skerry predicts, "as blacks feel increasingly squeezed by the kinds of
redistricting and employment controversies described here, their opposition to Hispanic participation in affirmative action can be expected to increase." Id. at 102.
136. See Moore & Mittelbach, Measuring Residential Segregation in 35 Cities, in Tim
CHANGING MExicAN AimiucAN 50, 81-82 (Gomez ed. 1972); D. Massey and N. Denton, Trends
in Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics and Asians. 52 AA. Soc. REv. 902-25 (1987).
For Mexican-Americans, the stay in the barrio is not likely to be permanent. "[W]hereas
primary and secondary immigrants settle in immigrant enclaves (barrios), subsequent generations
are more likely to follow the traditional tenement trial: from ghettos and barrios to the
suburbs. This process of residential dispersion . . . substantially reduces the social isolation
of Latinos and helps expedite their integration into the wider society." K. McCARTHY & R.
VALDEZ, CtRRENT AND FUTURE EFm cTs OF MExicAN IM11GRATION IN CAtnroHA 63 (1986).
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suits has been the inability to create districts in which they were a
majority. The ability of Mexican-Americans to live among Anglos
is no doubt responsible for the fairly high intermarriage rate. Studies
of the exogamy rates for Mexican-Americans report figures ranging
from five percent to more than fifty percent, depending upon
location and generation of residency within the United States. The
figure for blacks marrying Anglos is one to two percent, 137 and even
fewer blacks marry Mexican-Americans.
Studies of perceived social distance suggest little reason to believe
that common perceptions of discrimination have fostered a sense of
shared community among members of the two groups. 3 8 As to
perceptions of discrimination, studies show blacks to be much more
likely than Hispanic groups to perceive their groups as being disadvantaged. 39 Although perceptions of discrimination by MexicanAmericans increase with the length of stay among immigrants, and
with generations, the levels to which those perceptions rise are
modest. Consistent with these studies, government statistics indicate
that Hispanics file many fewer charges of discrimination than do

blacks. 140
In summary, plaintiffs in these cases are urging a proposition
seldom documented: the melting of two separate and distinct ethnic
groups into one. This proposition was not contemplated by Congress
when it amended Section 2, and comes very close to crossing the
line between protecting racial groups from discrimination in the
political process, and protecting a political group, some of whose
members are minorities, from political defeat. Moreover the seductive logic of a "Rainbow Coalition" based on lower socio-economic
status, shared history of discrimination and exclusion evaporates
upon more careful scrutiny of the significant differences in the two

groups' experiences and attitudes. Coalitions of minorities should,
under some circumstances, be recognized as falling within the pro-

137.

See E. MURGUIA, CmcANo INTER-MARUGAE: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY

(1975). Murguia reports that only five percent of Mexican-Americans married non-group
members in heavily Mexican-American Hidalgo County, Texas. In contrast, 34% of MexicanAmericans married exogomously in Southern California. Id. at 48-49. Horowitz reports studies
that found even higher rates, particularly among native-born Mexican-Americans in Ohio and
New York. Horowitz, supra note 122, at 81-2.
138. See discussion of social distance studies, Part VI infra, and discussion accompanying
note 199.
139. See discussion of studies on perceptions of discrimination, Part VI, and text accompanying notes 200-203.
140. Horowitz, supra note 122, at 86-87.
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tection of Section 2, but the determination that two groups have
become one should be made very cautiously.
V.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF

PROOF: OBSTACLES TO SATISFYING

Thornburg AND BEYOND
If the coalition can get beyond the problem of its qualification as
a "group" entitled to protection, or if the courts continue to ignore
the problem, difficulties of proof remain. To date, most coalition
suits have failed because the groups have been unable to demonstrate
"political cohesiveness." In the previous section, we argued that
this question should not be considered until the two groups have
demonstrated that they are indeed "one" for purposes of Section
2. As a practical matter, if the new "group" is unable to prove any
one of the Thornburg prerequisites, the case should fail. Proof of
political cohesiveness is perhaps somewhat more objective than proof
that the two groups are really one. If the groups are not politically
cohesive, then determining whether they are otherwise a "group"
for Section 2 purposes is unnecessary. 41 In this part of the article,
we examine the meaning of "political cohesiveness," the evidence
generally considered on the issue, and the special problems presented
by a coalition suit. Political cohesiveness is likely to be the most
important of the Thornburg prerequisites for coalition suits, but the
other prerequisites and the Senate report factors are potentially
problematic as well. A discussion of these issues completes this
section.
A.

Can a Coalition Demonstrate Political Cohesiveness?

The term "political cohesiveness" is not expressly defined in
Thornburg. The Court's comments concerning the requirement, however, suggest that plaintiffs must demonstrate that members of the
group vote sufficiently as a group to establish: (a) That there is a
"group" political agenda; and (b) that enough members of the

141. Thus the courts in, Pomona, Overton, and Hardee County, that found the two not
to be politically cohesive, reached an acceptable result, even though they may have made the
unwarranted assumption that a coalition of two minorities was the legal equivalent of one.
The two cases, LULAC and Campos, that allowed the numbers of blacks and MexicanAmericans to be combined "because the two groups were politically cohesive," quite probably

confused a political coalition with an ethnic minority.
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group can be expected to vote together to elect candidates from
single member districts who will further that agenda. The court
notes: "[I]f the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot
be said that [the election system] thwarts distinctive minority group
interests. 1 1 42 It quotes an article written by two civil rights lawyers:
To demonstrate [that minority voters are injured by at-large elections] the minority voters must be sufficiently concentrated and
politically cohesive that a putative districting plan would result in
districts in which members of a racial minority would constitute a
clear electoral choices are in fact
majority of the voters, whose
143
defeated by at-large voting.
The primary means the Court identified to demonstrate "political
cohesiveness" was to show that a "significant number of minority
group members usually vote for the same candidates."' 44 Problems
of interpretation are obvious. Does "significant" mean "majority"?
Does "usually" mean more often than not?
Logically, anything less than a "majority" voting together at least
"more often than not," would mean that most members of the
minority group did not share a common political agenda, or at least
were unable to agree on the candidates that would further that
agenda. Pragmatically, to benefit from single member districts, the
group would have to be "sufficiently cohesive" to control the
electoral outcome in at least one district. A group that would
constitute only fifty percent of the voters of a district would need
to be 100%70 cohesive to control the outcome. Likewise, groups with
a greater percentage of a district's voters would need to demonstrate
less cohesiveness.
1. The Evidence Generally Considered on the Issue of Group
Voting Behavior 45
For those accustomed to believing in the secrecy of the ballot,
discovering that social scientists can determine how groups of voters
have voted in particular election contests comes as somewhat of a

142. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1985).
143. Id. (quoting Blackshere & Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 34 HAsTINGs L.J. 1, 55-56 (1982)).
144.

Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 56.

145. The authors gratefully acknowledge the technical assistance of Dr. Harold Stanley,
Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, in the preparation of this segment of
the article. All opinions, and, of course any errors, are our own.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21

surprise. In the typical single-minority vote dilution case, involving
a minority group that is unevenly dispersed throughout the jurisdiction, group voting behavior can be reliably estimated. If the data
will permit, social science experts in voting cases use three complementary means for estimation: Homogeneous precinct analysis, regression analysis, and exit poll results.
Homogeneous precinct analysis is easily understood. Voting precincts that are overwhelmingly one-race (a frequently used standard
is ninety to 10000), are examined to determine which candidates the
voters in these precincts supported. If a jurisdiction is highly seg-

regated, and most voters vote in precincts that are roughly ninety
to 100010 one race, homogeneous precinct analysis obviously provides
a very accurate picture of voting behavior by race. 46 This methodology is not available in jurisdictions with no, or limited, one-race
precincts. Moreover, the behavior of minorities in homogeneous
precincts may not be representative of those living in "mixed-race"
precincts. Thus, social scientists may be reluctant to rely solely upon
the data provided by a few homogeneous precincts.
The second standard device for determining voter behavior, regression analysis, often is available to supplement homogeneous
precinct analysis, or as an alternative analytical device. In early
voting cases, regression was utilized merely to show a correlation
between the race of the voters and the votes received by candidates
identified with the minority. In its most basic form, the first step
in the analysis is to plot points on a graph. Each voting precinct
represents a point. The coordinates of the points are the black
percentage of the precinct, and the percent of the precinct's vote
cast for the black candidate. Next a line is constructed that describes
the best linear relationship fitting the points. The line produced is
the "regression line." The slope of the line is a measure of the
relationship between two variables (the percent black of the precinct,
and the vote received by a particular candidate). The diagram below
demonstrates basic regression:

146. Both homogeneous precinct analysis and regression analysis require the race of the
voters to be identified by voting precinct. In the absence of actual voter counts by precinct,
by race, derived from voter sign-in sheets, accurate registration records containing racial
identifications are reasonable data. Otherwise, it is necessary to extrapolate from census data.
Among other things, the quality of the data depends upon the recency of the census. Nine
years after the census, the population of the precinct could have changed significantly.
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Correlation coefficients ("r") range from 0 to 1 in magnitude and
will be either positive or negative. A correlation coefficient of + 1
would indicate a perfect positive correlation between the variables.
For example, if in the above graph each increase of the black
population was observed to correlate with exactly the same percent
increase in the vote for the black candidate, the slope of the line
would be + 1. Many cases found the relationship between black
population and the vote for the black candidate to be quite strong.
Correlations in the .90 and above range are common. If "r" is
squared, the resulting figure is a measure of the amount of variance
in the dependent variable that is explained by changes in the independent variable. In the hypothetical above, "r square" is equal to
.90. Therefore, ninety percent of the change in the vote received by
the black candidate can be explained by change in the black percentage of the precincts. 147

147. See Romero v. City of Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853, 869 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (for court
endorsement of this explanation).
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Despite the tendency of courts to believe otherwise-usually with
the substantial assistance of the plaintiffs' statisticians, 148 a high
correlation, without more, says little about voter behavior in the
jurisdiction. 149 High correlations are possible even though very few

blacks voted for the black candidate. Consider the following hypothetical: Ten precincts made up of 100 voters each, ten percent,
twenty percent, thirty percent black, and so on up to 100 percent.
The black candidate receives one percent of the vote in the ten
percent precinct; two percent in the twenty percent precinct, and so
on up to ten percent in the 100% precinct. The correlation between
the percentage black of the precincts and the percentage of the vote
received by the black candidate is + 1. For every ten percent increase
in the percentage black, there is a one percent increase in the votes
received by the black candidate. Despite the perfect correlation, a
maximum of ten percent of the black voters voted for him.1 0
The correlation coefficient does not provide information about
whether a majority of black voters supported a particular candidate.
It is, however, possible to use regression to estimate the percentage
of blacks who voted for a particular candidate. Note that in the
example above there was no precinct that was 100% black, the most
black being ninety percent. But note also that it is possible to
determine where a theoretical 100% black precinct would fall on the
regression line. Based on the relationship observed between the
percent black of the precinct and the vote for the black candidate,
and assuming that relationship would continue, then 91.8% of the
voters in our theoretical 100% black precinct would have supported
the black candidate.'' In opinions such as Thornburg, this is the
148. E.g., Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 368 n.30 (E.D. N.C. 1984) (the plaintiffs'
expert testified that correlation coefficients above .5 are relatively rare, and those above .9

extremely rare). Correlation coefficients for elections analyzed in the case ranged from .7 and
.98. This observation (rarity of such correlations) is much ado about nothing. Most social
science studies of other kinds of variables assume that there is no correlation between the
variables. Such an assumption in.the area of voter behavior would be counter to what is
generally known to be true, and what is a matter of common sense. Voters generally identify

with candidates whom they see as most like themselves. For black people in this country, race
is a point of significant identification. That black voters identify more often with black
candidates than do white voters can hardly be seen as "rare."

149.

However, the converse is not true. A low correlation between race of the voters and

the votes for the black candidate would suggest that voting is not along racial lines. Just how

high a correlation coefficient must be to be deemed significant is a matter of some disagreement.
150. The correlation coefficient says nothing about which voters in the precincts actually
supported the black candidate-except of course in the 100% black precinct where all the
votes had to come from black voters. Possibly all the votes received by the black candidate

in the other precincts actually came from white voters.
151. This figure can be approximated from a visual examination of the graph. The regression
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figure reported as the percentage of the black voters supporting
15
particular candidates.

2

The accuracy of the estimate produced by regression analysis is
influenced by several factors. First is the reliability of the data. If

registration or turn-out statistics are not available by race, the racial
makeup of precincts will have to be approximated from census data,
which may be outdated, or which may not match geographically the
voting precincts. Second is the number of voting precincts. The
accuracy of the estimate improves with greater numbers of data
points. Third is the distribution of the minority population within

precincts. If there is little variation in the independent variable
(minority percentage of the turn-out, registered voters or voting age
population) across precinct lines, the correlation coefficient will gen-

erally be low. Even if the correlation coefficient is statistically significant, the estimate of the vote for the minority candidate in a

hypothetical 100% minority precinct can be subject to a wide margin
153

of error.
In any given jurisdiction, the presence of some of the factors may
make the calculation of "political cohesiveness" problematic even if
a single minority group is involved. When statistical evidence is
unreliable, or unavailable, other evidence must suffice. Other evidence
might include an analysis of the behavior of the group in a larger
context. For example, if the jurisdiction challenged is a city with a
single polling place, an analysis might be done of the "city's"
minorities as a part of a larger jurisdiction, such as a county. Lay
testimony is also considered relevant, but should be recognized as
1 4
very limited in value.

line crosses the 100% black precinct at the 91 + point on the vertical axis. It can also be
determined more precisely by plugging 100% into the equation for the regression line: Percent
of blacks voting for the black candidate in 100% black precincts equals 19.7 (the intercept,
which equals the vote in 0% black precincts) + 0.721 (the slope of the line) x 100%. The
resulting figure is 91.8%.
152. The entire analysis is done by computer and is somewhat more complicated than
reported here, but this is the basic idea. There is little disagreement that the methodology will
reliably measure the relationship between the race of the voters and the vote received by
different candidates, assuming appropriate data are available. There is more disagreement as
to whether the estimate derived from extrapolating to a 100% black precinct is a reliable
estimate of how black voters actually voted.
153. For example, suppose all voting precincts were between 30% and 40% black. A range
of 10 percentage points in the independent variable may be insufficient to justify confidence
that any measured correlation with votes for the black candidate is the product of a true
relationship between the variables. Even more problematic is extrapolating from the last data
point-a 40% black precinct-out to the hypothetical 100% black precinct used to "estimate"
the percentage of blacks who voted for the black candidate.
154. See Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1493 (10th Cir. 1989). Lay witnesses can generally
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When the group involved is black, and the jurisdiction is in the
South, political cohesiveness should be subject to proof by any
reasonable evidence. Evidence from other voting cases, from exit
polls, and from studies by political scientists indicate that high black
support for black candidates in primaries, and for the Democratic
nominee in general elections is the norm. 155 In light of this substantial
body of evidence, it is perhaps justifiable to place a light burden of
proof of cohesiveness on black plaintiffs, and then shift the burden
of producing evidence to the contrary to the defendants, at least in
those cases in which blacks constitute a substantial, geographically
compact portion of the population. 5 6 As will be seen in the next
section, political cohesiveness of Hispanics is not nearly as well
documented, and is much more subject to local conditions. Moreover,
documented cases of political coalitions between blacks and Hispanics
are very rare. In coalition suits the plaintiffs must argue that a
condition seldom observed elsewhere is present in their jurisdiction.
Their burden of proof should be heightened accordingly.
2. The Courts' Consideration of Political Cohesiveness in
Coalition Dilution Cases

The first case' 57 in which black and Mexican-American plaintiffs
made an attempt to demonstrate political cohesiveness, Overton v.
be found to testify on both sides of the issue. Lay testimony, and its limits, were discussed
by the court in Overton v. City of Austin, Civ. No. A-84-CA-189 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 15, 1987)
(Mem. Op.) at 32. The court noted that the plaintiffs had offered lay testimony concerning
the cohesiveness of Mexican-Americans and blacks:
the witnesses are not competent to testify as to why other individuals voted in a
certain way. The witnesses do not purport to have performed any sort of survey or
analysis to support their views, nor do they purport to be experts in gathering and
interpreting data on voting patterns. Rather, they are merely offered as individuals
familiar with Austin politics, and with the black and Mexican-American communities.
In short, the affidavits offer some evidence of cohesiveness in terms of similarity of
concerns, but fail to offer much else.
Id. at 33. About defendants' witnesses, the court noted:
Like Plaintiffs' affiants, Defendants' witnesses are individuals who have been active
in Austin politics ....
The affidavits of both sides are not particularly helpful,
however, because they contain the opinion testimony of a small number of individuals
as to how two groups, containing over 107,000 people, will act.
Id. at 33-34. The court added, "[tihe opinion testimony might be of value if it were supported
by concrete evidence." Id. at 34.
155. See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
156. As noted earlier, if the black population is only barely able to satisfy the size and
compactness requirements (i.e., it is able to constitute only a slight majority of the voting age
population), then black voters would have to be nearly 100% cohesive to take advantage of
single-member districts. This kind of cohesiveness should require direct proof.
157. See Latino Political Action Comm. v. City of Boston, 609 F. Supp. 739, 747 (D.
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City of Austin,'-" was tried before Thornburg. The two groups
apparently did not seek to establish a "coalition" suit, but rather
each argued for a single member district plan that would provide a
district for their group. The trial court found for the defendants,
but the case was remanded for reconsideration in light of Thornburg.
The two groups argued for the first time on remand that their
numbers should be combined to meet the Thornburg prerequisites. 5 9
The court's opinion does not contain sufficient detail to permit an
evaluation of either side's evidence of cohesiveness. At one point the
court notes that the only evidence submitted by the plaintiffs was

"various unanalyzed election results, a tabulation of the votes cast

in predominantly black and Mexican-American precincts from 1975
to 1983, and the affidavits of two individuals as to their perceptions
of the cohesiveness of the two groups."6
Earlier the court notes that its polarized voting analysis was based
on data from voting precincts that were predominantly one race.

Only the Anglo precincts, which were ninety percent or greater would
have qualified as "homogeneous precincts." The few predominantly
Mexican-American precincts ranged from 60-89%, and the few black
precincts from 50-85%. The court noted that these precincts contained

only a small portion of the total voters of the three races.' 6' Nevertheless, the court utilized the precincts to determine polarization. 62
It is not clear from the opinion whether the reports of group
support for various candidates, which appear in the court's discussion
of political cohesiveness, also came from an examination of these
precincts.1 63 Whatever the source of the data, the court concluded

Mass. 1985) (court rejected the notion that blacks, Hispanics, and Asians should be grouped
together in a district so that their combined numbers would equal a majority). The court
stated: "In the absence of any credible evidence that Boston's various minority groups vote
as a bloc, however, there is no reason to believe that the creation of a district whose majority
consists of a plurality of minorities would, in fact, enhance the voting strength of any one
minority group." Id. at 748. See also Butts v. City of New York, 614 F. Supp. 1527 (S.D.
N.Y. 1985). The court noted: "Obviously, if the Black and Hispanic members of the plaintiff
class were to combine as one coalition, they could elect a fusion candidate, but this had not
heretofore been achieved in New York City, and is unlikely notwithstanding the tendency of
the literature to lump them together as if they were a single bloc." Id. at 1546.
158. Civ. No. A-84-CA-189 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 15, 1987), on remandfrom Overton v. City
of Austin, 798 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. Tex. 1986) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id. at 30-36.
161. Id. at 29.
162. Id. at 37.
163. The defendants' experts, Dr. Charles Bullock, and Dr. Susan MacManus later prepared
a paper on their analysis of voting behavior in Austin, which contains results consistent with
those reported in the opinion. They utilized regression analysis to estimate the voting behavior
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that the candidate preferred by Mexican-Americans was supported
by an average of sixty-nine percent of the black voters, and the
candidate preferred by blacks was supported by an average of seventythree percent of the Mexican-American voters. ("Preferred candidate" was not defined, but apparently the term was used to refer to
the candidate, regardless of race, who received the greatest number
of votes from the group). A more careful examination of the data
indicated that when a minority candidate ran, "Anglo voters voted
with one of the two minorities more often than the two minorities
voted together... In elections where Anglos ran against minorities
and the Anglos supported a different candidate than did the minority
4
groups, minorities voted together 5 times, and differently 4 times."'1
Moreover, in the only contest in which a black ran against a MexicanAmerican, each group supported its own candidate.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
carry their burden of proof. It noted that in a district made up of
both groups, the most likely outcome based on past performance
was that one group's candidate would lose to the other, with Anglos'
votes deciding the election outcome.1 65 The opinion is too confusing
on the matter of who voted for whom under what circumstances,
based on what evidence to allow for an evaluation of the determination of cohesiveness. What is crystal clear however, is that a
Mexican American had served on the council since 1975, and blacks
had served continuously since 1971. Mexican-Americans were thirteen
percent of the population, and blacks were twelve percent. Neither
districting plan offered by either group was likely to increase the
number of minorities serving on the council.
Like Overton, the next case, LULAC v. Midland's Indep. School
Dist.,'66 arose in Texas. Prior to Thornburg, the defendant voluntarily
of each group. No mention is made of this analysis in the opinion. Bullock and MacManus

concluded that the most frequent pattern of voting was for all three groups to support the
same candidate. In seven of eight contests in which a Hispanic was a majority or plurality
leader, Hispanics and blacks voted together. However, Hispanics supported the black candidate
in only one of the seven contests won by blacks. In contests in which Hispanic candidates
lost, only one involved a situation where blacks and Hispanics united. In the other two,

Hispanics and Anglos voted more alike. Black and Anglo voters did not support the Hispanic
candidate in five contests. Only four blacks lost to Anglos. Two were supported by blacks,
but not by Hispanics or whites. Thus they concluded that a minority coalition was more likely
when an Hispanic ran, but quite rare when the candidate was black. Bullock & MacManus,
Tri-Ethnic Voting Coalitions: Conflict or Cohesion? The Case of Austin, Texas, 1975-1985
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
164. Overton v. City of Austin, Civ. No. A-84-CA-189, at 32 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 15, 1987)
(on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
165. Id. at 37.
166. 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987).
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had agreed to change the at-large method of election, but the parties
could not agree on an appropriate replacement. The lower court
rejected a mixed plan (four single-member districts and three at-large
seats) in favor of a seven member plan proposed by the plaintiffs.
This plan contained one district with an Hispanic majority, and a
second with a black plurality (not majority). Neither group could
independently satisfy Thornburg.167 Therefore, the issue on remand
was whether the two groups could be combined.
If evidence on the cohesiveness issue was difficult to evaluate in
City of Austin, comparable evidence was non-existent in LULAC.
The only evidence cited by the court was testimony that showed that
"Blacks and Hispanics worked together and formed coalitions when
their goals were compatible. Additionally, the bringing of this lawsuit
provides evidence that blacks and Hispanics have common interests
that induce the formation of coalitions." 168 To recognize this "evidence" as "proof" of cohesiveness is shocking. By this court's
reasoning, the Thornburg prerequisite is satisfied by the fact that
suit has been brought! As to working together "when their goals
were compatible," do not all groups do that? Is not the problem
that their goals may not be compatible very often? Curiously, the
court rejected a survey that demonstrated that the two groups had
"mutually exclusive interests," and that the two groups were "politically distinct" because those facts were "not relevant to how cohesive
169
people will be" or how they would vote.
As a practical matter, what the court did in LULAC was to
provide a "remedy" in the form of the best available single member
district to each of the two groups, even though neither could satisfy
Thornburg's requirements of size and compactness. The remedy
selected-one majority Mexican-American district, one district in
which blacks were a plurality, and five other "Anglo" districtssuggests that neither the plaintiffs nor the court really believed

167. Id. at 1504. The existing school board had five members. Most courts to consider the
issue have concluded that the existing number of seats cannot be expanded in order to permit

the group to satisfy Thornburg. See McNeil v. City of Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937
(7th Cir. 1988) cert. denied 109 S. Ct. 1769 (1989). If proportional representation were the
law, a group would need to be 20% of the potential voters to be "entitled" to a seat. Blacks
were less than nine percent of the total population of the county, and a smaller percentage of
the voting age population. Hispanics were 15% of the total population, but their younger

average age, and the inclusion of non-voting aliens in that number, would have meant that
they were a much smaller percentage of those potentially able to cast a ballot.
168.

1986).
169.

See LULAC v. Midland's Indep. School Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596, 606 (W.D. Tex.

Id.at 607.
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members of the two groups were politically fungible.170 Ironically,
Section 2, which specifically disavows a right to proportional representation, was used to provide greater than proportional representation for two groups, neither of whom alone would have qualified
l7
for a seat had proportional representation actually been the law. '
Romero v. City of Pomona,72 a coalition suit decided in favor of
the defendants, is perhaps the best example of the difficulties involved
in establishing the voting behavior of groups in a tri-ethnic city. In
1980 the total population of Pomona, California, was 92,742 persons,
of whom 30.5% had Hispanic surnames, and 18.6% of whom were
black. After adjustments for age and citizenship, the percentage of
those eligible to vote who were Hispanic was less than twenty percent.

The minority population was not particularly concentrated. Of the
twenty-five voting precincts in the city, none had more than a sixty
percent Hispanic population, or a sixty-three percent black population. Only three precincts had combined minority populations that
exceeded seventy percent when adjusted for age and citizenship. 7 1
The absence of any precinct that was close to ninety percent "one
race" foreclosed the use of homogeneous precinct analysis, 174 and
there were questions about the reliability of the regression analysis.
The plaintiffs' expert essentially ignored the problem of cohesiveness

170. Hispanics were 54% of the population of the first district, which was also 15% black.
The generally younger age of the Hispanic population, the probable presence of a substantial
number of non-citizens, plus their much lower registration rate would suggest that Hispanics
had little chance of controlling the district by their votes alone. Blacks were actually more

likely to control the "black" district, even though they were only 42% of the total population,
Hispanics who made up 24% of the total population, were a much smaller portion of the
actual voters, while black and Anglo registration rates were about equal. A black candidate
with strong black support would need only slight support from Hispanics to be elected.
171. The lower court's decision was affirmed by a panel of the 5th Circuit. See LULAC
v. Midland Indep. School Dist., 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987). However, that opinion was
vacated by the en banc court of appeals. Two members of the panel found the lower court's
finding of cohesiveness not to be clearly erroneous. That opinion also relied upon a regression
analysis performed by an expert for the plaintiffs, which was not specifically mentioned by
the lower court. It is not completely clear from the opinion, but apparently the expert combined
the two groups for purposes of the regression analysis, and then concluded that the "minorities"
voted differently from "non-minorities." LULAC, 812 F.2d at 1501. See also Campos v. City
of Baytown, 849 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1988) cert. denied 109 S. Ct. 3213 (1989) (same
methodology, employed by the same expert).
172. 665 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
173. Id. at 861.
174. Id. at 860. Plaintiffs' expert apparently did offer such an analysis. He did not have
actual precinct registration data by race, so he extrapolated from the census information, a
procedure particularly prone to error when dealing with a Hispanic population. The census
units making up a precinct could well be ninety percent Hispanic, but because of the low
average age, and the presence of a substantial number of non-citizens, can produce a registered
voter population that was 60% or less Hispanic.
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by combining the two groups as a "minority" group. (In other
words, he assumed the blacks and Hispanics were cohesive, and
utilized regression analysis to demonstrate that they voted differently
than whites). He found a strong correlation (.90) between the percent
minority in a precinct, and support for a minority candidate, but
admitted that "cross-racial support for candidates [was] concealed in
75
the correlation" by combining the groups.'
It should be obvious that a regression analysis that utilizes the
combined minorities as the independent variable provides no information about the voting behavior of the two groups vis a vis one
another.' 76 The proper procedure would have been to perform a

regression analysis incorporating each group as a separate variable.
Further reliability problems were presented by the absence of precinct
level population data by race.
The Pomona court recognized the fallacy involved in combining
the groups for purposes of regression analysis. Any illusion that the
plaintiffs' regression analysis established that the two groups voted
together was dispelled by an exit poll, also conducted by plaintiffs'
political science expert. The poll was conducted of voters as they left
the polling place for an election that included both a black and an
Hispanic among the candidates for the city council. The poll established that seventy-one percent of the Hispanics voted for the white
opponent of the black candidate, and that sixty percent of the blacks
77
voted for the Anglo opponent of the Hispanic candidate.
This same flawed methodology (combining blacks and Hispanics
to create a "minority" category for the regression analysis) was
utilized by the plaintiffs' expert in yet another case in Texas, Campos
v. City of Baytown.178 There, however, both the trial court and the
court of appeals were overcome by the modern day sorcery of
statistics. The court of appeals appeared to recognize that both groups
had to support the same candidates:

175. Id.
176. The fact that a majority of the combined group of blacks and Hispanics vote together
is meaningless information. This information certainly is not evidence that Hispanics support
the same candidates as blacks. And there is no support for the proposition that if any
combination of blacks and Hispanics (i.e., 90% of the blacks, and 10% of Hispanics) vote
for the same candidates, the requirement has been meet. This would be to treat the two groups
as one without any evidence that they are. By that reasoning, all voters in a particular election

vote alike because when all voters, blacks, whites and Hispanics, are combined, a majority of
them support the same candidates.
177. Romero, 665 F. Supp. at 860.
178. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 849 F.2d
943 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3213 (1989).
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The key is the minority group as a whole. Of course, if one part
of the group cannot be expected to vote with the other part, the
combination is not cohesive. If the evidence were to show that
blacks vote against a Hispanic candidate, or vice versa, then the
minority group could not be said to be cohesive.

79

Where the court erred was in its belief that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated that blacks supported Hispanics, and vice versa. 1 0
Unfortunately, there was no exit poll in Baytown to clear away the

smoke as there had been in Pomona. Perhaps the two groups in fact
voted together in Baytown, but the plaintiffs' regression analysis that
combined the two groups was not evidence of that fact.' 8'
The lower court in Campos rejected the one item of unimpeachable
evidence of how some of the jurisdictions black voters had reacted
to Hispanic candidates. Only one small precinct qualified as a homogeneous black precinct. This precinct voted overwhelmingly for
the white Anglo opponent of the Hispanic candidates. Because that

179. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988). By this statement,
the court seemingly rejected any notion that only a majority of the combined "new" group
need be cohesive-i.e., that if 65% of a combined group made up of fifty blacks and fifty
Hispanics supported a black candidate, the "group" is cohesive, even though it is impossible
to tell whether a majority of each group supported the candidate. Id. Even this is ambiguous
because the court also noted: "Baytown argues that ... plaintiffs must show that Blacks are

cohesive, that Hispanics are cohesive and that Blacks and Hispanics are together cohesive. We
think that burden is too great, if not impossible, in certain situations." Id. In a footnote, the
court explains, "For example, if the heavily minority precincts in an election district have
roughly equal percentages of both Blacks and Hispanics, it could prove to be nearly impossible
to attribute the votes of those precincts to one minority group or the other but quite possible
to determine whether the two minority groups together are politically cohesive." Id. at 1243
n.6. These conflicting positions are difficult to reconcile ("only a majority of the combined
group must be cohesive," with "if one group cannot be expected to vote with the other, the
combination is not cohesive"). Perhaps the court is saying that if a majority of the two groups
can be seen to support the same candidates, then it is incumbent upon the defendants to prove
the potentially unprovable: How the two groups voted individually-thereby effectively shifting
the burden of proof. Perhaps the court was thoroughly confused, or simply disingenuous in
its willingness to believe that the two groups were cohesive.
180. As noted earlier, a procedural "catch 22" resulted in the denial of the defendants'
request for rehearing en banc. Judge Higginbotham, joined by the five other judges who voted
for a rehearing, wrote a scathing dissent, ending with an invitation to the defendants to seek
Supreme Court review: "Today we fail to give to protected minorities, district courts, state
government, and the bar our best considered reading of the core meaning of legislation that
speaks to the essence of our arrangements of governance. We can do better, but if we will
not, hopefully, the Supreme Court will do so." Campos, 849 F.2d at 946 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
181. To test the possibility that a correct statistical analysis might nevertheless support the
finding of cohesiveness, the authors obtained the election returns and racial breakdown by
precinct used by the plaintiffs expert in his regression analysis. We asked Dr. Harold Stanley,
a Political Scientist at the University of Rochester who is experienced in the use of regression
analysis, to use this information to perform the correct analysis. He ultimately concluded that
from the data available it was not possible to perform an analysis that would produce results
sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for an opinion as to how the two groups had voted.

1990 / Minority Vote Dilution Suits

precinct contained less than thirteen percent of the town's black
population, the court concluded the results in this precinct were not
representative of the voting behavior of blacks as a whole. 82 Ordinarily, the results in a single homogeneous precinct should be viewed
cautiously when offered as representative of the behavior of black
voters in mixed precincts. In this case, however, the results in the
homogeneous black precinct were in line with those generally documented by the social science literature: black voters ordinarily do not
vote in large numbers for Hispanic candidates. The burden of proof
on the issue of cohesiveness was on the plaintiffs, who were forced
to argue that blacks and Hispanics in Baytown behaved differently
than those groups had generally been observed to behave in other
circumstances. By rejecting the homogeneous precinct analysis, the
courts in Campos effectively reallocated the burden of proof to the
defendants. Moreover, the courts accepted as proof of cohesiveness
the results of a methodology that could be described as "smoke and
mirrors" statistics. The inappropriateness of combining two minority
groups to decide if they vote together is not a matter upon which
reasonable experts could legitimately disagree. Rather the analysis
upon which the court relied in Baytown was simply incorrect-as
incorrect as saying that two plus two is equal to five. 183
One suspects that Campos really represents a rejection by this
court of the Thornburg prerequisites. The Campos courts may have
believed that single member districts would make it easier for Hispanic candidates to be elected, even if they lacked the geographic
compactness necessary to be a majority of a single member district,
and even if very few blacks actually supported them.'8 While such

182.

Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1248.

183.

The same expert testified for the plaintiffs in both Campos and Pomona. In Pomona,

however, he conceded the obvious: His regression analysis using the combined minorities could
not be used to determine if blacks supported Hispanic candidates, and vice versa. "The

plaintiffs' expert ...

testified that the lack of cross-racial support for candidates is concealed

in the correlations because the totals presented combined hispanic and black voters." See
Romero v. City of Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853, 860 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
184. Events following the post-Campos elections in Baytown provided little support for

the unified minority thesis. A Mexican-American was elected in the "minority" district (and
a second Mexican American was elected to an at-large seat). However, blacks apparently were

not satisfied with the results. An Anglo councilman was quoted as saying "[t]he talk on the
street is, Blacks aren't happy because they feel left out of the system." Howell, Baytown
Council Harmonious, But Both Sides Are Watching, Houston Chronicle, October 30, 1989, §

A, at 11. In response to that dissatisfaction, the Mexican-American elected from the "minority"
district now favors increasing the size of the council so "Blacks would be guaranteed one
district in which they would be a majority of votes." Id.
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a view may be supportable, it is not the view adopted by the Supreme
Court in Thornburg.
B.

Other Problems of Proof in Coalition Dilution Suits

The primary obstacle to the success of a coalition dilution suit is
likely to be the inability to demonstrate cohesiveness. Theoretical
and practical problems are, however, presented by the remaining
elements of the case.
1. Compactness and numerosity
Courts have tended to lump together two issues that deserve
separate consideration: (1) Does the group have the numbers to
justify an expectation that it should, in the absence of discrimination,
be able to elect a candidate of its choice; and (2) is the group
sufficiently concentrated geographically to benefit from single member districts? Courts have generally answered both of these questions
by determining if a single member district plan can be created in
which the minority group would be a majority of the potential
voters.' 85
When two minority groups are involved, there is a strong likelihood
that one group, usually blacks, will be residentially concentrated,
while the other group will be geographically dispersed. Inevitably, a
districting plan will be of greater benefit to the more concentrated
group. In Concerned Citizens v. Hardee County, 18 6 a coalition dilu-

tion case involving a rural county in southern Florida, more than
eighty percent of the black population, which was seven percent of
the county total, lived in two neighborhoods that were separated
geographically by most of the county's white population. The His-

185.

Logically, the two issues should represent separate limitations. A group that lacks

sufficient numbers to be "entitled" to a seat (i.e., a 10% minority in a jurisdiction which has
a five member legislative body), is not in a position to claim that "but for" discrimination it
would be able to elect candidates of its choice. Conceivably, a highly concentrated minority
could be a majority of a single member district, even if it has only half the votes necessary
to "qualify" for a seat. (This can be accomplished by drawing a district that includes all the
minority population, and then keeping the total population on the low side for one-person,
one-vote purposes). Thus if "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single member district" is interpreted literally, a minority group that would not

have been assigned a seat had proportional representation been the law potentially could
acquire "double" its voting strength under Section 2.
186. C.A. No. 86-209-CIV-T-17 (M.D. Fla., April 24, 1989) (Mem. Op.) (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal).
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panic population, thirteen percent of the total, was dispersed throughout the county. The "most" minority district that could be drawn
was thirty-four percent black and 16.3% Hispanic. Both black neighborhoods, and thus eighty-five percent of the total black population,
were in the "minority" district, but severity percent of Hispanics
lived outside the district supposedly created for their benefit as well.
If the two minority groups were truly fungible, then the fact that
"their" district left out most of the Hispanics, and included most
of the blacks would not have mattered. In Hardee the judge did not
have to address the issue of whether this district satisfied Thornburg
because he concluded that the two groups were not politically co87
hesive.'
2. A bloc voting majority that defeats the candidates of choice
of the minority
The "candidates of choice" must be determined before it is possible
to know if they were defeated, a task which can be impossible in
some situations.'8 8 Suppose that the evidence shows that blacks and
Hispanics have supported the same candidates a majority of the time.
Suppose further that when the "group supported" candidate has
been white or Hispanic, the candidate has received enough white
votes to be elected, but all "group supported" black candidates have
been defeated. Has "bloc voting" resulted in the defeat of the
minority's candidates?
3.

The proportionalrepresentation defense

Carrying the previous hypothetical a step further, suppose that the
combined minority voting age population is twenty percent, and that
one seat in five has been held by an Hispanic for at least ten years.
Has the group achieved proportional representation?
4.

The remaining Senate report factors

Similar problems can be presented by the remaining factors. In
most of the South, blacks, but not Hispanics, were subject to
187. Id. at 31.
188. In Hardee County, Hispanics were from zero to 17% of the population in each of
the eleven voting precincts. Therefore, neither regression analysis nor homogeneous precinct
analysis were available to determine Hispanic voting behavior.
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officially sanctioned discrimination, including discriminatory restrictions on the right to vote. Hispanics tend to lag significantly behind
others in registration rates' 89 while black rates often exceed those for
whites. In some areas plaintiffs may possibly demonstrate a history
of discrimination against blacks in areas of education, housing and
health, but be unable to demonstrate any continuing impact of this
discrimination on black rates of political participation. For Hispanics,
the political participation rates may be low, but the lack of participation is easily explained by factors unrelated to past discrimination.190
The practical problems of proof bring us back to our initial
observation. When voters do not share a common racial or ethnic
background, which has been their primary source of identity, both
within and without the group, a claim that they are "one" for
purpose of politics should be viewed skeptically. To determine whether
the elements of a dilution suit are present for the "minority," without
considering the two groups very different histories, and present day
circumstances is impossible. Very seldom has disproportionate representation among the "have-nots" been a sufficient basis for separate ethnic groups to form even political alliances, much less for
them to form a new "discrete and insular" minority.
VI.

COALriONS BETWEEN BLACKS AND HISPANICS: A POLITICAL

SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE

In the preceding section, we carefully scrutinized the handful of
cases in which black and Mexican-Americans have sought to be
combined as a single group for Section 2 purposes. In most of those
cases the plaintiffs were unable to establish political cohesiveness.
Two cases reached a contrary conclusion, LULAC and Campos. We
have suggested that the evidence was insufficient, indeed basically
missing entirely, in LULAC to support a finding of cohesiveness. In
Campos our examination of the plaintiffs' expert's voting analysis

189. The differences between Hispanics and others are reduced when citizenship is taken
into account.
190. In addition to non-citizens, the Hispanic population may include large numbers of
migrants, and persons who are new to the community. Moreover, the adult Hispanic population
contains disproportionately more persons than the general adult population in the 18 to 26
year age range, which studies show participate less than older adults. See VOTNo AND
REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER,

CURRENT POPULATION REPORTs, Series

1980

(ADVANCE REPORT) BUREAU OF CENSUS,

P-20, No. 435, Feb. 1989, at 4-5.
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revealed that the analysis was fatally flawed, and did not establish the
blacks and Mexican-Americans had supported the same candidates.
In several of the cases, the available data did not lend itself to the
standard statistical devices for determining voter behavior. Thus, the
possibility remains that the two groups really were cohesive, but the
plaintiffs lacked any reliable means to prove it. Each case must be
decided on its particular facts, and the absence of cohesiveness in one
jurisdiction does not preclude the possibility of cohesiveness elsewhere.
Nevertheless, political scientists recognize, as do those trying to develop
a strategy to elect candidates to national or statewide office, that
certain groups can be expected to vote together most of the time. If
there exists substantial evidence that blacks and Hispanics "normally"
do support the same candidates, then perhaps less should be demanded
by way of proof in specific cases. 191 If, however, the evidence is to
the contrary, then these suits should be viewed very skeptically. In
this section we examine the record amassed by social scientists concerning the political behavior of these groups.
In the past ten years, a number of studies in political science have
addressed the question of "minority coalitions." Here we will examine,
and in some instances extend, that record in order to assess the ability

of blacks and Hispanics to form and sustain durable political coalitions
that are reflected in voting for the same candidates.
A.

Internal Cohesion within the Black and Hispanic Communities

To what extent do the black and Hispanic populations, considered
separately, constitute cohesive political groups? If a racial or ethnic
group does not demonstrate a high degree of internal cohesion, that
group is unlikely to successfully merge with another minority in a
durable voting coalition.
The cohesion test is easily met by the American black population.
The great majority of blacks share a common history of slavery and
have continued to suffer pervasive discrimination late in the twentieth
century. Legal barriers to political participation have only gradually
been lowered. Given these conditions it is hardly surprising that public
opinion research documents that "the most profound political division

191.

Of course, the problem of whether the two really should be entitled to claim they are

a "new" discrete and insular minority would remain, even if the evidence were to show that
routinely the two did support the same candidates.
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between groups in the U.S. is the division between blacks and Whites."'9
Blacks exhibit a very high degree of voting cohesion. In partisan
terms they are the most Democratic group in the country, having
provided overwhelming support (85%o-98°0)191 for Democratic presidential nominees between 1964 and 1988. Blacks usually vote together
in state and local elections as well. As black political involvement
around the country has increased, an increasing polarization of the
electorate along racial lines has occurred. Edward G. Carmines and
James A. Stimson recently concluded that race is the most important
factor transforming American politics. 1' 4
In the case of Hispanics, internal cohesion is clearly at a much
lower level. A basic difficulty arises from the "Hispanic" categorization. Many persons so classified do not identify themselves as such,
in sharp contrast to self-identity patterns among blacks (or "Negroes"
or "African Americans" as the fashion changes). Nor can substitute
generic labels ("Latinos") be found that most persons of Spanish
origin apply to themselves. Group identity among Hispanics is strongly
associated with specific origins. Hispanics in the Southwest are overwhelmingly "Mexican-Americans." In the Northeast, "Puerto Ricans"
are dominant. "Cuban Americans" are the great majority among
Hispanics in Florida. Efforts to homogenize Hispanic populations into
a single cultural group are strongly resisted as reflected in the critical
comments of Raul Ruiz, professor of Chicano Studies at California
State University at Northridge, on Spanish-language television network
programming: "These folks are trying to create an electronic Latino
culture, an electronic compound of the various groups. But that's not
the reality of the Latino populations of this country." 19s
The distinctions within the American Hispanic populations are political as well as cultural. Mexican-Americans, the largest and longest
established Hispanic group, are characterized by "significantly lower

rates of voter registration and turnout than Anglo and black voters,
primarily Democratic party affiliation, and moderately high patterns
of party voting."''

Puerto Ricans also tend to be partisan Democrats,

§ 179 (3d ed. 1988).

192.
193.

Id.

194.

CARMRnS & STIMSON, IssuE EvoLTIN: TBE RACIAL TRANS FOniATON OF Am~rmucAN

ERIKSON, LUTTBEG, & TEDIN, A4ERicAN PurBit OPINION

PoLmcs (1988).

195. Mydans, Chargesof Bias in Spanish-LanguageTelevision, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1989,
at 14, col. 2.
196. Garcia & Arce, Political Orientations and Behaviors of Chicanos: Trying to Make
Sense of Attitudes and Participation,in LATINOS AND THE POLTICAL SYSTEm 101, 128 (F.
Garcia ed. 1988).
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but have very low levels of political participation, which is partly
97
explained by their continuing ties to the home island and its politics.
All Puerto Ricans are United States citizens, many Mexican-Americans
are not, which distinguishes the political agendas of the two groups.
The third large Hispanic population in the United States, CubanAmericans, are quite distinct because of their mostly recent arrival
(after the Castro revolution in 1959), their relatively high social class,
upward mobility, and strong ties to conservative and Republican
politics. 98 Most are fiercely anticommunism and greatly concerned
about United States policy in Central America, issues of little import
to most Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans.
The differing backgrounds, patterns of political participation, and
issue agendas among the three large Hispanic groups in the United
States suggest great difficulty in forging broad black-Hispanic coalitions. With regard to specific Hispanic populations, the lower rates of
participation and lack of group cohesiveness among Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans also create barriers to effective alliances. And
with Cuban Americans the lack of common political goals effectively
rules out long term coalitions with blacks.
B. Attitudinal Studies Comparing Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites
Some recent survey data have been generated that focus on the
possibilities for blacks and Hispanics forging coalitions in an Anglodominated political system. James Dyer, Arnold Vedlitz, and Stephen
Worchel interviewed over 1200 respondents in Texas in the summer
of 1986. Using a "social distance" scale, they found that: "In general,
blacks and Mexican-Americans are more accepting of Anglos than
they are of each other. Further, in most cases, Anglos are more
accepting of Mexican-Americans than are blacks."' 99 The fact that
blacks and Mexican-Americans in Texas have suffered discrimination
in the Anglo-dominated society failed to produce attitudes conducive
to forming a coalition against the majority group. Their data argue
against the position "that being the target of prejudice is a sufficient

197.

See Jennings, The Puerto Rican Community: Its Political Background, in

LATINOS

AND Tim PoaTCAL SYSTEM 59, 65-80 (F. Garcia ed. 1988).

198. de los Angeles, From Exiles to Minorities: The Politics of Cuban Americans, in
LATUNOS AND TIE POLTMCAL SYSTEM 81, 98 (F. Garcia ed. 1988).
199. Dyer, Vedlitz, & Worchel, Social Distance Among Racial and Ethnic Groups: Demographic Correlates,70 Soc. Sci. Q. 607, 611 (1989).
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condition to bring outgroups together.... Indeed, the targets of
prejudice maintain greater distances between themselves than they do
with the empowered majority group."
Bruce E. Cain and D. Roderick Kiewiet surveyed Californians just
after the 1984 election. They found that "the political interests of
California's immigrants/minorities diverge in sometimes surprising
ways." 20 With specific regard to black-Hispanic patterns, Cain and
Kiewiet noted:
perceived discrimination and lack of opportunity do not automatically
generate political alliances. Although such perceptions might make
some members of a particular minority group more sympathetic
toward California's other minority groups, others might become more
antagonistic in response. For blacks the issue is especially poignant.
Are newly arrived Latinos fellow victims of discrimination, or just
the latest wave of immigrants who serve only
to retard black progress
22
as they scramble up the economic ladder. 0
These differences led Cain and Kiewiet to conclude:
minority group leaders cannot count on common perceptions of
discrimination and justice to foster a natural coalition between their
group and other minorities. As a source of political support, liberal
Whites would appear to be at least as promising as other minority
groups. 2°3
C. A National Test: Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition

Nationally, the one strong test of black-Hispanic coalitional possibilities was provided by Reverend Jesse Jackson's presidential bids,
particularly his 1988 effort. In his second national campaign Jackson's
strategy of building a "Rainbow Coalition" was critically dependent
on adding Hispanic support to his strong base in the black community.
Confined to a largely black base, Jackson could hope to win only
Deep South states and the District of Columbia and take no more
than thirty percent of the Democratic primary vote. But if his campaign
generated strong Hispanic support, Jackson could get forty percent of
the total national vote and win a dozen primaries. Among the winnable
primaries were Texas and California where the combined black and

200.

Id.

201. B. Cain & D. Kiewiet, Minorities in California, paper presented at symposium at
California Institute of Technology, March 5, 1986, at 1-2.
202. Id. at 111-99.
203. Id. at III-111.
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Hispanic vote was expected to exceed forty percent. Accordingly,
Reverend Jackson made strenuous and partially successful efforts in
1987 and early 1988 to line up support from Mexican-American and
Puerto Rican leaders.
The electoral results, however, were disappointing. The New York
Times-CBS News poll of voters in 14 Southern and Border states on
Super Tuesday (including Texas and Florida) found Jackson getting
ninety-one percent of the black vote, but just twenty-one percent of
the Hispanic vote.? 4 In California, Governor Dukakis won sixty-one
percent of the Hispanic vote on June 7, 1988, compared to Jackson's
thirty-six percent? 5s
The failure of Jackson's campaign in the key state of Texas, which
he would have won had he carried a majority of the Hispanic vote,
is illustrated by election returns from heavily Mexican-American precincts in Congressional District 18 and City Council District I (they
overlap) in Houston, Texas. The blue collar precincts were represented
by the late Congressman Mickey Leland and on the city council Ben
T. Reyes, both strong Jackson backers in 1988. Despite their efforts,
the mostly Hispanic voters in their districts gave Michael Dukakis
twice as many votes as Jesse Jackson. [See Table 1]
TABLE 1
Democratic Presidential Primary Vote in Heavily Mexican-American
Precincts in Houston, Texas: March 8, 1988
Precinct
9
10
11
44
46
62
65
69
79
TOTALS

Jackson
54
57
72
59
138
142
57
40
76
695

Dukakis
91
188
104
135
217
190
190
97
163
1,375

Gore
28
28
34
24
26
44
77
21
43
325

Source: Office of County Clerk, Harris County, Texas.

204.

New York Times, March 10, 1988, § I, at 26.

205.

New York Times, June 9, 1988, § II, at 11.

Gephardt
7
16
18
17
14
30
24
11
23
160
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D. The PS Urban Coalition Studies
The Summer issue of PS, a journal published by the American
Political Science Association, included a series of case studies on
minority coalitions in large American cities. The central findings from
four of the six with regard to black-Hispanic alliances are summarized
below. In the remaining two cities, Atlanta and Philadelphia, the
studies indicated the Hispanic population was too small to be a factor
in local politics.20
(1) Los Angeles. Raphe Sonenshein found that under the leadership
of Mayor Tom Bradley, a black-Jewish coalition had dominated city
politics since the early 1970s. Hispanics had been drawn into the
coalition, but very much as junior partners. Sonenshein concluded
that:
The Los Angeles case illustrates the difficulty of building three-sided
coalitions among blacks, White liberals, and Hispanics. Despite huge

numbers, Hispanics have been much less successful than blacks in
winning political incorporation in Los Angeles. In fact, black-Hispanic alliances have been more prominent in many Eastern and
Midwestern cities than in Los Angeles. Competition between blacks
and Hispanics for political positions and for White liberal support
has weakened the many links blacks and Hispanics have forged over
the years of the minority struggle for equality in Los Angeles. 2w
(2) New York. John Mollenkopf found that despite their large
combined populations (forty-four percent in 1980), blacks and Hispanics were poorly represented among elected officials in New York
City. He found that minority influence in the city had declined since
the 1960's and early 1970's despite their population growth. One
reason for this was:
Black and Hispanic political mobilization efforts have often worked
at cross purposes in New York City (Falcon, 1985). While Browning,
Marshall and Tabb note tensions between the groups in the Cali-

fornia cities, they conclude that black incorporation strengthened
Hispanic incorporation. No such result has occurred in New York.
The small relative size of the black population contributes to this
tension. On its own, the black community is simply not large enough

206. Stone, Atlanta: Protest and Elections are Not Enough, PS, Summer 1986, 618, 624;
Munoz & Henry, Rainbow Coalitions in Four Big Cities: San Antonio, Denver, Chicago, and
Philadelphia, PS, Summer 1986, 598, 600.
207. Sonenshein, Biracial Coalition Politics in Los Angeles, PS, Summer 1986, 582, 589.
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to cause the kind of breakthrough that took place in Chicago,
Detroit, or Atlanta. But the divisions between blacks and Hispanics,

and indeed between ethnic factions within these groups, runs far
deeper. Blacks and Hispanics do not support each other at the
polls. An attempt to select a consensus minority challenger to Mayor

Koch in the last election floundered because when no strong black
candidate agreed to run, the established Harlem leadership would
not support Hispanic leader Herman Badillo. 28

(3) Chicago. Carlos Munoz, Jr. and Charles Henry noted that
while Mayor Harold Washington received little Latino support in his
crucial 1983 Democratic primary victory (he got 12.7% of the Hispanic vote, twelve percent of the white vote, and eighty percent of
the black vote), he quickly moved to broaden his political coalition
and gained considerable support from Hispanic leaders. Although
Mayor Washington's relatively brief tenure made it difficult for the
authors to assess the consequences of his victory, they concluded
that "based on his pledges one can presume that Washington's
election will further political incorporation and subsequent policies
benefitting minorities, both Latinos and blacks.''2°9
(4) San Antonio. Mayor Henry Cisneros's political success rested
on combining strong support in the Mexican-American community
with backing from white business elites. Munoz and Henry found
Cisneros enjoyed support from blacks, but their small population
(eight percent) made only a modest contribution to Cisneros's suc210
cess.
(6) Denver. Mayor Frederico Pena's election in 1983 was partly
based on the strong support he received from Hispanic voters although he "did not receive the endorsement of the established
Chicano politicians and community leaders. 211 Given the small Mexican-American population, Pena needed a much larger coalition to
win citywide election. That coalition:
was comprised of representatives from labor, the elderly, the physically disabled, gays, women, and environmentalists. He was also
supported by the incumbent mayor's brother, white millionaires like
and after
oilman Marvin Davis and land developer Lee Ambrose,
212
the primary the coalition expanded to include blacks.

208. Mollenkopf, New York: The Great Anomaly, PS, Summer 1986, 591, 593.
209. Munoz & Henry, Rainbow Coalitions in Four Big Cities: San Antonio, Denver,
Chicago, and Philadelphia,PS, Summer 1986, 598, 600.
210. Id. at 604.
211. Id. at 605.
212. Id. at 606.
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(6) Miami. Racial politics in this Florida city have a polarized,
"zero-sum" quality in which gains by one group are perceived as
losses by another. This is especially true in black-Hispanic relations.
Christopher L. Warren, John F. Stack, Jr., and John G. Corbett
summarized local racial relations in 1986 as follows:
The contacts, rivalries, and conflicts between the black and Hispanic
communities are apparent with regard to virtually all aspects of
political, economic, and cultural life in Miami. The internationalization of the community and its issues, the problems faced by
blacks related to representation and issue articulation in local political institutions, the divergence of special interest agendas for
blacks and Hispanics respectively, questions of local governmental
structure, and policies of economic development have all played a
part in reshaping minority politics in Miami. Hispanic and black
immigration has permanently transformed Miami's black-white racial setting into a much more complex tri-ethnic, indeed, multiethnic
international environment. While the analogy is exaggerated to be
sure, former City of Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre's description of
Miami as the Beirut of the West suggests the level of tension and
213
conflict that exists.
Marshall concluded that:
The articles also underscore the difficulty of forming multiethnic
electoral coalitions involving blacks and Hispanics. The obstacles
seem greatest in New York and Miami, where the groups are in
direct opposition. Tensions between the two groups are prominent
also in Los Angeles, Denver, and San Antonio. The Most successful
214
coalition seems to be in Chicago.
E.

The Browning-Marshall-Tabb Study of California Cities

Drawing on research in the late 1970's and early 1980's, Browning,
Rogers, and David H. Tabb published Protest Is Not Enough: The
Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics in
1984.215 They documented a good deal of cooperation and some
successful alliances between blacks and Hispanics. However, they
also noted:

213. Warren, Stack, & Corbett, Minority Mobilization in an International City: Rivalry
and Conflict in Miami, PS, Summer 1986, 626, 632.
214. Browning & Marshall, Is Anything Enough, PS, Summer 1986, 635, 637.
215. R. BROWNING, D. MARSHALL, & D. TABB, PROTEST Is NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE
OF BLACKS AND HIsPANIcs FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS (1984).

682
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[I]t would not be accurate to conclude that' blacks generally supported the political aspirations of Hispanics or that black incorporation necessarily facilitated the incorporation of Hispanics. Some
black activists regarded Hispanics as whites who were achieving
political influence with little effort, that is, on the coattails of the
black mobilization movement. Where blacks were able to form
successful biracial coalitions without explicit Hispanic participation,
they did so, and blacks in such coalitions were not notably receptive
Even when they supported the same
to Hispanic interests 216....
coalition, relationships between the two groups sometimes remained
highly competitive, as in San Francisco. Only in Sacramento were
they clearly cooperative, perhaps in part because blacks comprised
the smallest component of the coalition there and could not afford
21 7
to alienate their partners.
F.

Coalition Politics in Dallas

The 1979 redistricting of Dallas's city council created a tri-ethnic
district in West Dallas wherein blacks and Mexican Americans made
up two-thirds of the population. The plan's drawers hoped such a
district would give Mexican Americans representation on the realigned
council, which also included two districts dominated by blacks and
seven by Anglos. The strategy worked initially as Ricardo Medrano
created a "minority coalition" of blacks, Mexican-Americans, and
gay Anglos to win elections in 1979 and 1981. However, the coalition
unravelled in 1983 when prominent black leaders in the district
refused to support Medrano when he would not commit to stepping
down in the future and allowing a black to be the coalition's
218
candidate.
Medrano was defeated by an Anglo who had significant black
support in a runoff in April, 1983. After the election a "bitter"
Ricardo Medrano blamed black leaders for his defeat. A Dallas
Morning News story reported his assessment:
District 2 has "most definitely gone Anglo for good," he said,
blaming black leaders John Wiley Price, Mattie Nash and Jessie
Jones for a white winning the minority-district seat.

216. Id. at 122.
217. Id. at 124.
218. See Fessenden, Progressive Voters President Says Medrano's Job Is on Line, Dallas
Times Herald, April 14, 1983, § C, at 5.
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"They need to be congratulated. They have torn the foundation (of
the Black-Brown coalition) down ...
"
His loss has hurt the chances for future minority districts, he
said. He indicated he would be a candidate in Dallas County
commissioner elections in the future. "If minorities can't even
support a minority, how can you argue for more minority districts?"
said the 28-year-old grocer, who political analysts said had alienated
21 9
blacks during his tenure on the council.

Medrano's pessimistic forecast has held up. As of January 1990,
an Anglo has won four consecutive elections in the "minority coalition" district, and no Hispanic has won elsewhere in the city.
G.

The Meier/Stewart Public School Board Study

Political scientists, Kenneth J. Meier and Joseph Stewart examined

school board elections and policies in 137 multiracial districts, using
a 1986 mail survey of districts with more than 5,000 students and at
least five percent Hispanic enrollment. Their conclusions were as
follows:
This research examines the feasibility of rainbow coalitions, particularly those between blacks and Hispanics. We are skeptical that
black-Hispanic coalitions are likely because very few appear to exist
in urban politics and because the logic of rainbow coalitions assumes
that the dominant Anglo coalition must remain passive when confronted with a potential rainbow coalition. We suggest that an
alternative view of politics is the power thesis. The power thesis
holds that intergroup relations will be characterized more by competition and conflict than by cooperation. This theory predicts that
Anglo-Hispanic coalitions will be far more likely to form than
black-Hispanic coalitions.
Based on 137 large, multiracial school districts, we find election
results that are more consistent with the power thesis than the
rainbow thesis ...
Our research leads us to predict that many more Anglo-Hispanic
coalitions will form than black-Hispanic coalitions. This prediction
raises an important political question. Because Hispanic representation benefits Hispanic constituents, Hispanic political elites are
rational to form coalitions with Anglo politicians. Because blackAnglo coalitions are unlikely, however, Hispanic leaders should

219. Bauer, Medrano Blames Black Leadersfor Defeat, Dallas Morning News, April 17,
1983, § A, at 20.
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drive a hard bargain in terms of public policy benefits before

agreeing to coalitions with Anglo politicians.

2°
0

H. Another Look at Chicago and New York
In 1986 Chicago appeared to offer the most promise for a durable
black-Hispanic coalition. That promise seemed to be fulfilled in the
1987 mayoral election in which Mayor Washington carried the heavily
Latino 26th and 31st wards by 61.2% and 56.1% against former
mayor Jane Byrne in the Democratic primary. Washington also
enjoyed strong support from the Latino council members in 19871988. But after Harold Washington's death in 1988, his coalition on
council fragmented in a bitter battle over the interim mayor position.
Black Alderman Eugene Sawyer eventually secured a majority, with
most of his votes coming from whites who had opposed Mayor
Washington.
Forced to run in a rescheduled Democratic primary in 1989, Sawyer
was able to mobilize nearly as strong support in black areas as
Washington had received in 1987, but the other parts of the deceased
mayor's coalition swung to Richie Daley. This was very much the
case in the Latino wards. The 26th went for Daley 6,976 to 2,609
(72.8%), and the 31st by 6,101 to 3,315 (64.8%).22l
In assessing what happened to the minority coalition Harold Washington had built in the early and mid-1980's, local analyst Charles
M. Madigan noted that one "lesson was that the most important
parts of Harold Washington's coalition were Harold Washington and
'' 2
the era that presented him to the voters as a mayoral candidate. 1
A different pattern emerged in the 1989 New York City election.
Despite the traditional conflicts between blacks and Hispanics noted
in Mollenkopf's 1986 study, David Dinkins pulled together a multiracial coalition to defeat Mayor Ed Koch in the Democratic primary
and Republican Ralph Giuliani in the general election. Table 2
summarizes racial voting patterns in the primary and general elections.
220. K. Meier & J.Stewart, Jr., In Search of Rainbow Coalitions: Racial Ethnic Representation on Public School Boards, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September, 1989, at 13-15.
221. The 1987 and 1989 Chicago returns are from the Chicago Tribune, March 2, 1989, §
2, at 4.
222. Madigan, Washington Lesson Fell on Deaf Ears, Chicago Tribune, March 1, 1989, §
1, at 1.
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Table 2
Racial Voting Patterns in 1989 New York Mayoral Elections
Dem. Primary Vote % For Gen. Election Vote Go For
Dinkins
Koch
Dinkins
Giuliani
Blacks
93%
3%
91%
7%
Hispanics
54%
41%
65%
34%
Whites
29%
61%
27%
71%
Source: New York Times exit polls, September 14, 1989, p. B4;
November 9, 1989, P. Bll.
Dinkins' victories reflected near unanimous support from fellow
blacks, majorities from Hispanics, and a significant minority of white
voters (Jesse Jackson got only about fourteen percent of the white
vote in the April 1988 New York primary). Do these results herald
the emergence of a unified minority bloc vote in New York City?
No election analyst has drawn such a conclusion. Rather, explanations
of Dinkins' success stress his style and personality, the widespread
dislike for Mayor Koch, and a sense that Dinkins could best reduce
223
racial tensions in a polarized city.
.

Summary

This review of available studies on black-Hispanic coalitional prospects has established several basic patterns.
(1) Black-Hispanic voters (Cuban-Americans excepted) share a
commitment to the Democratic party. Blacks are very strongly Democratic, Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans less so.
(2) When partisan considerations are removed, as is the case in
most local elections which are either decided in the party primaries
or non-partisan elections, the coalitional tendencies of black and
Hispanic voters vary greatly. In a few instances, as in Chicago from
1983-87, a reasonably strong alliance has been forged. But in other
cases (New York in the 1970's and 1980's, Miami in the 1980's),
conflict, not cooperation, characterizes black-Hispanic relations.
(3) When alliances have been built, keeping them together is no
small task, as the experience of Chicago in 1988-89 and Dallas attest.
223.
col. 3.

Sam Roberts, Finding a Way to Win, New York Times, September 14, 1989, at 1,
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(4) Several conditions seem to enhance the prospects for successful
black-Hispanic coalitions. Skilled leadership seems especially critical,
and is often in short supply. In many cases successful minority
interaction has occurred as part of a larger "liberal" coalition that
includes whites (Jews in Los Angeles, business leaders in San Antonio,
environmentalists in Denver). These whites have often added critical
organizational skills and financial resources that have facilitated the
coalition's survival. The prospects for successful coalitions are enhanced when the elements of the coalition are sufficiently large to
have a realistic chance of winning important elective offices.
In sum, the empirical evidence indicates that black-Hispanic coalitions can be created, but it is a difficult task. Certainly there is no
"natural" tendency for black and Hispanic voters to support the
same candidates, just as there is "natural" tendency for them to
support different candidates. That being the case, it would seem to
require exceptional circumstances for blacks and Hispanics to form
such durable political coalitions that, for Section 2 purposes, they
can be combined to meet the Thornburg test.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In this Article we have attempted to answer the question, under
what circumstances should a "rainbow coalition" be entitled to claim
dilution of its voting strength? In short, the answer is "very seldom."
The purpose of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was to provide
relief to minority groups whose racial or ethnic status placed them
at a disadvantage in the political process. Section 2 was not meant
to insulate minorities from the normal perils faced by any group
seeking to utilize the political process to advance group interests, one
of which is that the group's numbers may be insufficient to provide
a base from which candidates identified primarily with the group can
achieve election. The Supreme Court formally recognized the importance of numbers in Thornburg v. Gingles when it declared that
groups too small to constitute a majority of a single-member district

could not claim that at-large elections were responsible for the defeat
of "their" candidates.
"Coalition dilution" suits that are attempts by one or both groups
to overcome the group size limitations of Thornburg should not be
recognized. The reasons, we have suggested, are twofold-one theoretical, the other practical. The theoretical difficulty with these suits
is that the Voting Rights Act provides no protection from dilution
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for the voting strength of a political group. Only racial or ethnic
groups that have become political groups in an effort to alleviate the
difficulties they share as result of discrimination and exclusion are
entitled to the extraordinary relief available under the Act. The
underlying assumption of the Voting Rights Act is that members of
certain racial or ethnic groups have common needs by virtue of their
shared experience as members of a group that suffered discrimination.
Even these groups cannot claim dilution unless they can demonstrate
that group members recognize their common needs and are united
in their efforts to meet those needs through the political process.
To be distinguished from mere political allies, distinct groups
seeking to claim dilution of their combined voting strength must
share much more than temporal political goals. To be within the
protection afforded by the act, these groups should be required to
establish that they have interests that transcend politics-interests
roughly equivalent to those shared by members of a single minority
group. Perhaps the litmus test should be whether the two groups
consider themselves "one" when each group could have benefited
separately. Did blacks consider Mexican-Americans to be "black" in
evaluating the need for affirmative action? In other apportionment
situations in which Mexican-Americans had the opportunity to be a
majority of a district, were they just as happy to be thirty percent
of a district that was also thirty percent black?
The practical problem with coalition suits is that only rarely do
discrete minority groups form even temporary political alliances. Most
coalition suits have failed because the plaintiffs have been unable to
demonstrate that members of the two groups were politically cohesive,
as required by Thornburg. The findings of these cases are consistent
with the pattern of political interaction generally observed between
blacks and Mexican-Americans. A careful review of the social science
literature reveals only rare instances of political coalitions between
blacks and Hispanics.
Proponents of coalition dilution suits argue that minority groups
are natural allies because of their shared exclusion from the dominant
society, and their similar lower socioeconomic status, which, proponents maintain, is the product of past discrimination. Despite the
simplistic logic of this position, it does not comport with the reality
revealed by social science studies. Those studies suggest just the
opposite. The rarity of documented political alliances between minority groups is the natural consequence of differences in their
attitudes and perceptions. Studies indicate that minorities in fact
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identify more closely with the dominant group than with other
minorities. Moreover, perceptions of discrimination vary widely among
groups. Blacks, for example, are much more likely than Mexican
Americans to perceive themselves to be victims of discrimination.
Still other studies suggest that the underlying causes of lowered
socioeconomic status differ among minority groups. Different root
causes of poverty are likely to lead to different, possibly even
conflicting, demands on the government.
The appeal of the Rainbow Coalition is no doubt based in part
on the much older notion that all "oppressed" groups could overcome their difficulties if only they would unite against their oppressors. "If only" turns out to have been a big "if." History provides
few concrete examples of the oppressed joining together to rid
themselves of a common oppressor. Those who did often experienced
a serious falling out, once the oppression was lifted. Unfortunately,
so it has been with groups in this country who find themselves
"disadvantaged" in the political arena because of their identity as
racial or ethnic minorities.
In most instances, a coalition suit is less likely to be based on a
genuine notion of brotherhood among disadvantaged groups than
upon a shared desire to be rid of a common oppressor: At-large
elections. Unless over the long term the two groups see themselves

as one, and actually vote together, a change to single member districts
cannot benefit both groups, and may not benefit either.

